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SEEING THE OLD LADY: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE AGE OLD 
PROBLEMS OF DISCRIMINATION, 
INEQUALITY, AND SUBORDINATION 
Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman* 
Abstract: In recent years, legal scholars have used insights from cogni-
tive and social psychology to explain that, despite significant gains, dis-
crimination persists in America. Specifically, such scholars argue that 
our current antidiscrimination legal system, aimed at overt, conscious, 
and intentional conduct is not an effective tool for combating current 
forms of discrimination that are often subtle, unconscious, and uninten-
tional. This article builds on that work by illustrating that, while insight-
ful, the perspective from which these scholars approach the problem of 
discrimination is really no different from that which informs the cur-
rent antidiscrimination system they seek to change. Accordingly, this ar-
ticle will explain how the perspective of these scholars is the same as 
that informing the current system. Second, this article will put forth an 
alternative perspective and then demonstrate how the new point of view 
advocated for opens up new possibilities with respect to how we might 
eradicate discrimination from American society. 
Introduction 
 There are some who would say that everything they needed to 
know they learned in kindergarten,1 but for me, some of the most valu-
able lessons I have learned came courtesy of my English teacher during 
my first year in high school. This teacher was a rather eccentric older 
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1 See generally Robert Fulghum, All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kinder-
garten: Uncommon Thoughts on Common Things (Villard Books 1988) (1986). 
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man who wore wooden ties to class, used to sit in a chair with no back 
but with support for his knees, and who taught us to spell by having us 
jump in the air and touch each letter. He taught us word roots and the 
rules of grammar through clever rhymes and sayings, most of which I 
remember to this day. He required us to complete every task “eighty-
two” times—his metaphor for the importance of revision—and a yawn 
in class earned the offender a set of ten push-ups or a lap around the 
school, depending on how frequent the offense. However, with all of 
his unconventional methods and creative ways, the things I remember 
most were the logic games and brain teasers, for they were the activities 
through which I learned the most. Operating under the belief that “just 
as one uses calisthenics to exercise one’s body, one must also work to 
exercise one’s mind in order to keep it in shape,” our teacher had a 
closet full of logic games that he had collected over his long career. 
Through the use of those games we learned how to think critically and 
“outside of the box.” We learned to reason through problems the likes 
of which we had never seen and through those games we learned the 
paramount importance of perceiving a problem correctly in order to 
reach an appropriate solution. This latter point was best illustrated on 
one particular day about half-way through my freshman year. 
 On this day our teacher started class with a brain teaser. However, 
this time it was not one of the games from his closet but a picture he 
had us look at that he had hung on the chalkboard. He asked us to 
look at the picture and write down what we saw. I looked and saw a 
black and white drawing of a young woman, dressed in Victorian style 
clothing with a beautiful, elaborate cap on her head. I wrote down my 
answer and waited for the rest of the class to do the same. After a few 
minutes passed, our teacher asked the girl in front of me what she saw; 
like me, she saw a young woman. The teacher then proceeded to ask 
another kid and then another and another, and each, like me, saw a 
young woman. Finally he came to a student towards the back of the 
class, a smaller child, a bit of a misfit. With some hesitation, the child 
shakily admitted that he did not see a young woman; he saw instead an 
old lady. As soon as he gave his answer the majority of the class pro-
ceeded to roll their eyes and snicker behind their palms. How could he 
see an old lady when obviously there was not one? 
 Our teacher did not roll his eyes, nor did he snicker. Instead he 
looked the ostracized kid right in the eye and with a smile told him he 
was exactly right, there was an old lady and how great it was that he had 
been able to see it. The rest of us stopped mid-giggle and stared at the 
picture again. There must have been some mistake as there was obvi-
ously no old lady in that picture. Perhaps our rather eccentric teacher 
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had finally lost his mind. The teacher asked the strange student if he 
would come to the front of the class and trace for us the picture of the 
old lady. Still rather tentative, although gaining some confidence now, 
the student walked to the front of the room and identified for us the 
old lady in the picture. Sure enough she was there, occupying the same 
space as the young woman. What appeared to be the ear of the young 
woman was at the same time the eye of the old woman. What appeared 
to be the neck and a necklace of the young woman was actually the 
chin and the mouth of the older woman. What appeared to be the hat 
of the young woman was the hair of the old.2 Once the old lady was 
pointed out, she was obvious. In fact, I could not believe that I had so 
easily missed her. But missed her I had, as had most of the rest of the 
class. 
 The obvious point of this brain teaser was to demonstrate to us 
how the mind can adopt a particular point of view, and, once it has 
done so, how difficult that point of view can be to change. Often, when 
this happens, one literally cannot see the world in a different way, even 
if that different way is in fact present, valuable, legitimate, and helpful. 
The lesson also illustrated how changing an entrenched view is even 
more difficult when a large group of people subscribe to that view. I 
have no doubt that had our teacher not been so supportive, the timid 
child at the back of the class never would have spoken up or challenged 
the rest of us. As a consequence, his views would have gone unheard 
and we would have persisted in ours none the wiser, having never con-
sidered a different perspective because we had no idea there was an-
other one to consider. The lesson I learned that day is one that may be 
helpful to us in trying to use the law as an effective tool for combating 
the persistent problems of subordination and discrimination in this 
country. 
 Before America became America, it had a discrimination and sub-
ordination problem.3 America’s problem with discrimination produced 
one of the bloodiest wars in American history, brought about the re-
structuring of our Constitution, sparked social movements, engendered 
the passage of several laws, and prompted the creation of a variety of 
task forces and commissions.4 This problem has been the subject of 
countless articles, books, movies, poems, songs, television shows, con-
ferences, and other discussions, and through all of these efforts we have 
                                                                                                                      
2 A version of this picture is available at http://www.mathworld.wolfram.com/Young 
Girl-OldWomanIllusion.html. 
3 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
4 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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made significant progress in addressing and eradicating this societal 
problem. Yet, it persists and persists. Like the mythical Hydra,5 it would 
seem that as soon as we think we have addressed subordination and 
discrimination, they rear their ugly heads again. This has occurred so 
frequently that some believe it is an intractable and unsolvable prob-
lem, that the extremely complex and difficult problem of eradicating 
discrimination and subordination will never be solved.6 While I cer-
tainly agree with many of the sentiments and valuable insights that have 
caused some to reach this conclusion, I am not willing to subscribe to 
that outcome yet. For I believe that, much like my classmates and I who 
were only able to see the young woman and not the old lady, part of 
why we have had such a difficult time eradicating subordination in this 
country is that we have not actually addressed the core problem in all 
of its complexities. We have not done so because, to a large extent, we 
have only seen a portion of the problem, not the whole. Much like a 
doctor who misdiagnoses a disease, we have addressed certain symp-
toms and manifestations based on what we see and are willing to ac-
knowledge, but have not been able to cure the disease as a whole be-
cause we have not addressed the root of the problem. 
 This article is an attempt to begin to do that. The first in a series of 
four articles, this article asserts that part of why our antidiscrimination 
laws have not been as effective as we might hope in eradicating all 
forms of discrimination and subordination is because they are based on 
a view of subordination and discrimination that is at best incomplete 
and at worst inaccurate. Thus, our approach and the laws we have de-
veloped are also incomplete. Specifically, I argue that our approach to 
addressing discrimination through our antidiscrimination laws is based 
on the view that discrimination is the anomaly in this country: a break 
from the norm, perpetrated by a few bad actors at specific points in 
time.7 Thus, our laws are geared toward identifying those bad actors 
and providing redress to the victims of those specific instances. Conse-
quently, our antidiscrimination laws have done fairly well addressing 
and helping to eradicate blatant forms of discrimination but unfortu-
                                                                                                                      
5 See generally G. S. Kirk, The Nature of Greek Myths 184–85 (1975) (describing the 
mythical Hydra as a multi-headed monster whose heads grew back twice as fast when cut 
off). 
6 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, The Permanence of Racism, 22 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1103, 1104 (1993) 
(discussing the continued elusiveness of equality for African Americans and even stating 
the thesis that “[b]lack people will never gain full equality in this country”) (quoting Der-
rick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism 12 (1992)). 
7 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
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nately have done little to adequately address discrimination in its many 
other forms.8 
 The goal of this article is to try to add to the conversation in which 
several scholars have engaged in recent years regarding how we can 
make the law a more useful tool in combating all forms of discrimina-
tion.9 Building on the valuable insights of the last few decades by criti-
cal scholars across disciplines including the groundbreaking work of 
several critical race theorists, psychologists, and sociologists, this article 
asserts that one of the necessary components to making the legal ap-
proach to discrimination more effective is to change the conception of 
discrimination that underlies that approach. In other words, if we can 
reconceptualize the problem, perhaps we can also develop better solu-
tions, solutions that are viable though possibly not readily apparent 
from our current point of view. 
 Towards that end, I argue that discrimination and subordination 
are not the anomaly but the norm in American culture. As American as 
apple pie, they are part and parcel of the way we perceive the world. 
They are embedded in the way we have structured our country and 
permeate our institutions, important societal systems, and cultural con-
structs.10 Thus, the perception of discrimination as an anomaly perpe-
trated by bad actors at specific points in time in an equal and nondis-
criminatory world has allowed us to alleviate the symptoms of blatant 
discrimination, yet it has not allowed us to address the problem as a 
whole. Accordingly, in this article I argue for us to take the first steps in 
changing that perspective. Part I reviews the development of antidis-
crimination law in the United States with an emphasis on articulating 
the current, dominant perception of discrimination and subordination 
such law embodies. Specifically, this view rests upon the assumption 
that discrimination and subordination are anomalies perpetrated by a 
few bad actors in isolated pockets of society. Part II reviews recent inno-
vative proposals to use or change the law to make it more responsive to 
the persistent problem of discrimination and subordination. This part 
explains how these new proposals tweak the dominant perspective in 
some significant ways but still leave some of its fundamental underlying 
premises intact. Part III explains what both the dominant perspective 
and these innovative scholars are still missing, specifically, that dis-
crimination and subordination are the norm in, are embedded in, and 
                                                                                                                      
8 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
9 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
10 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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permeate every aspect of American life. This part begins by looking 
critically at the history of the United States and then explaining what 
new perspective may be derived from that history. It then provides ex-
amples to illustrate how the proposed change in point of view would 
affect our approach to the problems of discrimination and subordina-
tion.11 
I. The Crisis in American Antidiscrimination Law:  
The Unfulfilled Promise 
A. A Little Bit of History 
 The inherent difficulty of solving complex social problems 
through the legal system is a rather obvious and important issue, for 
even if one is able to correctly define the particular problem, there are 
still variables, competing interests, and other factors that make fashion-
ing and implementing an effective solution a Herculean task at best 
and an impossible one at worst. The problem of eradicating subordina-
tion and inequality in American society is no different. 
 The first major societal attempt to address this problem on a na-
tional scale came after the Civil War in the form of the First Recon-
struction.12 The passage of a series of laws13 and three constitutional 
amendments,14 led to the end of slavery and the first steps towards 
forming a more equal nation. The passage of these laws and constitu-
tional amendments appeared to have brought sweeping change to the 
                                                                                                                      
11 As mentioned, this is the first of what I intend to be a series of four articles. Thus, 
my goal in this article is only to present the proposed change in perspective as a viable 
alternative in our quest to effectively eradicate discrimination and subordination. The 
second article will propose a new definition of equality that better articulates the goal of a 
truly equal society than do the definitions we currently employ. The third article will take 
the new concepts proposed in the first two and suggest how we might begin to work those 
ideas into a practical and cost-effective scheme that starts from the perspective proposed in 
this article and develops structures and rules under the law that might allow us to reach 
the equal society as defined in the second article. However, the radical changes proposed 
in the first three articles would not be without their consequences. Thus, the fourth article 
in the series looks at the potential consequences, both good and bad, of implementing the 
proposals put forth in this body of work. 
12 Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction 
in Black America, 1945–1990, at 1–12 (2d ed. 1991) (identifying 1865–1877 as the first 
period of reunion, reconstruction, and racial readjustment); William A. Sinclair, The 
Aftermath of Slavery 37 (1969) (referring to the period right after the Civil War as the 
era of Reconstruction). 
13 See Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335; Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 
16 Stat. 140; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. 
14 U.S. Const. amends. XIII–XV. 
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country. Apart from no longer being slaves, blacks voted in record 
numbers,15 held public office,16 sat on juries,17 and meaningfully par-
ticipated in American society in many other ways.18 However, these gains 
were met with massive resistance including the rise of the Ku Klux Klan 
and similar groups, and the widespread violence such groups perpe-
trated that worked to intimidate and prevent the newly freed slaves and 
their allies from exercising their rights.19 In the face of this resistance, 
those in power proved they would only protect the rights of the newly 
freed slaves so long as it was politically expedient.20 Consequently, within 
less than twenty years after emancipation, the newly gained freedoms 
began to disappear.21 
 By 1867, every state in the South had passed laws whose sole pur-
pose was to relegate the freed men and women to as close a condition 
of slavery as possible without technically reinstating the peculiar institu-
tion.22 These laws, popularly known as Black Codes, provided sanctions, 
usually in the form of servitude or even whipping, for offenses such as 
vagrancy and disorderly assembly.23 These laws also sought to return 
blacks to a condition of servitude by forcing them to sign yearly labor 
contracts (through which they were punished if they left the plantation 
before the contract expired), apprenticing black children who were 
                                                                                                                      
15 Derrick Bell, Race, Racism, and American Law 46 (5th ed. 2004); Michael L. 
Levine, African Americans and Civil Rights: From 1619 to the Present 100 (1996). 
For example, in Louisiana in 1896 there were 130,334 registered black voters making them 
a majority of registrants in twenty-six parishes. C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career 
of Jim Crow 85 (3d rev. ed. 1974). 
16 Bell, supra note 15, at 46; Richard Wormser, The Rise and Fall of Jim Crow 27 
(2003). See generally Black Congressmen During Reconstruction: A Documentary 
Sourcebook (Stephen Middleton ed., 2002). 
17 Levine, supra note 15, at 102. 
18 Id. at 99; see Wormser, supra note 16, at 19–20 (describing the many ways in which 
blacks participated in civic life during Reconstruction, primarily through Union Clubs). 
19 Levine, supra note 15, at 116–18; Woodward, supra note 15, at 82–93; Wormser, 
supra note 16, at 22, 24–26, 29. See generally Sinclair, supra note 12 (describing the many 
forms opposition and violence took after the Civil War and the end of slavery). 
20 See Levine, supra note 15, at 104–06 (describing waning white support for Recon-
struction from 1870 on, which eventually resulted in the Hayes-Tilden compromise of 1877 
whereby the Democrats conceded the presidency to the Republicans in return for the end 
of Reconstruction); Wormser, supra note 16, at 30–33. 
21 If one marks the beginning of the end with the 1877 Hayes-Tilden compromise, the 
newly found freedoms of the ex-slaves lasted scarcely fourteen years after Lincoln signed 
the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863. 
22 Levine, supra note 15, at 289 (defining “black codes” as “[l]aws passed by the for-
mer Confederate states between 1865 and 1867 intended to return blacks to virtual slav-
ery”); Sinclair, supra note 12, at 37–73. 
23 Sinclair, supra note 12, at 62–65. 
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taken from parents deemed unfit, and by leasing out the labor of con-
victs.24 At the same time, while slavery may not have gained a foothold 
in the North and many in the North may have pushed for abolition, 
white supremacy and the inequality it engendered were still the order 
of the day throughout the country.25 The belief in white supremacy and 
the desire for reconciliation and imperialistic adventures throughout 
the world combined to shift the attitudes of many in the North to those 
of their southern brothers by the end of the nineteenth century.26 
 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt the final blow to the 
aspirations of Reconstruction in a series of cases that either struck 
down the laws intended to protect the newly freed slaves and give some 
content to their freedom,27 or read the new amendments so narrowly 
as to make them largely ineffective.28 The recalcitrance of the South, 
the increasing lack of support in the North, an ineffective executive, 
and an unsupportive Supreme Court ultimately combined to bring the 
progress which had followed the Civil War to a virtual standstill. In fact, 
it would be another half century before the nation would see a similar 
step toward equality. 
 Beginning roughly with the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 
1954,29 the United States once again turned a corner on the road to 
true equality.30 Often referred to as the Second Reconstruction, this 
                                                                                                                      
24 Levine, supra note 15, at 95–96. 
25 Woodward, supra note 15, at 17–20. 
26 Id. at 69–74. 
27 See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (striking down the provi-
sions of the 1870 Enforcement Act meant to protect against terrorism by the Ku Klux Klan 
and similar groups); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (invalidating sections of 
the Enforcement Act of 1870 meant to secure the right to vote under the Fifteenth 
Amendment). 
28 Using an extremely narrow definition of national citizenship, the Court held in the 
Slaughter House Cases that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not allow the federal government to protect privileges and immunities that lay 
within state power. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Court then went on to define state 
power as that “for the establishment and protection of which organized government is 
instituted.” Id. at 76. In that way the Court effectively read the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause out of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 76–78; see also The Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. 3 (1883) (determining that (1) the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to state 
action, and therefore Congress could not pass laws targeting the behavior of individuals, 
and that (2) while the Thirteenth Amendment may apply to individual actions, its provi-
sions did not extend so far as to offer protection against wrongs such as a refusal of ac-
commodation at an inn or on a public conveyance). 
29 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
30 While many mark the beginning of the Second Reconstruction at the time of the 
Brown decision or slightly before, see Marable, supra note 12, at 18, 40–41, it was not as 
though the fight for civil rights remained dormant during the period between the First 
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period resembled the First Reconstruction in terms of the kind of 
change brought about in a relatively small amount of time.31 However, 
these eras do differ in significant ways. Unlike the First Reconstruction, 
the second was backed by a vibrant protest movement that gained in-
ternational notoriety and support, the groundwork for which had been 
laid in the intervening fifty to sixty years.32 The Second Reconstruction 
took place in an America where the attitudes of the majority of Ameri-
cans had changed; where the hazards of prejudice and discrimination 
were brought home through World War II and the Nazi campaign, 
which put in stark relief the potential consequences of severe prejudice 
and discriminatory action; and where white supremacy and America’s 
racist attitudes were hurting her image and credibility abroad.33 Apart 
from this, these two eras also differed because the Second Reconstruc-
tion proved more successful than the first. 
 As with the First Reconstruction, Congress passed national laws 
meant to address the problem of discrimination and to help guarantee 
basic civil rights.34 However, unlike the First Reconstruction the Su-
preme Court was not so quick to strike down these laws,35 and the ex-
                                                                                                                      
and Second Reconstructions. In fact, it was the work of many during this period that laid 
the groundwork for the Second Reconstruction and helped pave the way for the changes it 
brought to be more longstanding than those of the First Reconstruction. See generally, e.g., 
Leland B. Ware, Setting the Stage for Brown: The Development and Implementation of the 
NAACP’s School Desegregation Campaign, 1930-1950, 52 Mercer L. Rev. 631 (2001) (describ-
ing the work of the NAACP and, in particular, Charles Hamilton Houston during the time 
between the two periods of Reconstruction). 
31 Marable, supra note 12, at 3–4. 
32 See generally Levine, supra note 15, at 109–65; Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for 
Black Equality 1954-1992 (rev. ed. 1993); Marable, supra note 12; Aldon D. Morris, 
The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for 
Change (1984). 
33 Sitkoff, supra note 32, at 14–17. 
34 Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89; Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 
88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
35 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (finding that Congress 
did not exceed the power granted to it in section two of the Fifteenth Amendment in hold-
ing certain challenged provisions of the Voting Rights Act constitutional); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power). Not only did the 
Court uphold the constitutionality of these laws, many would argue that the Court led the 
charge with respect to securing civil rights during this era. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, The 
Supreme Court’s Pursuit of Equality and Liberty and the Burdens of History, in Redefining 
Equality 205, 205 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 1998) (noting the Court’s 
Brown decision “is commonly regarded as the signal event in the modern quest for racial 
equality”). But cf. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Irrelevant Court: The Supreme Court’s Inability to 
Influence Popular Beliefs About Equality (or Anything Else), in Redefining Equality, supra, at 
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ecutive was more effective in enforcing them.36 Thus, although there 
was still widespread resistance to the changes wrought during the Sec-
ond Reconstruction, the response was more effective in the face of that 
resistance. Also, the general public appeared more willing to accept 
such changes than during the time of the First Reconstruction. While 
during both periods there was staunch resistance to the move to make 
the country more equal, during the Second Reconstruction that resis-
tance did not result in the complete reinstitution of racist and dis-
criminatory ideals. Further, after the Second Reconstruction, the sen-
timents of a majority of Americans began to change, at least on the 
surface.37 Consequently, the change engendered the second time 
around was much more permanent, widespread and meaningful. 
 De jure laws relegating blacks, women, and other minorities to le-
galized second class citizenship are largely a thing of the past as are 
many other forms of blatant discrimination.38 This change has been 
                                                                                                                      
172, 187 (questioning whether the Court has any real influence with respect to Americans’ 
views on equality, and concluding that “there is no evidence supporting the power of the 
Court to increase support for racial or gender equality”). 
36 For example, President Eisenhower reluctantly sent federal troops into Arkansas in 
response to Governor Faubus’s blatant defiance of a federal court order to integrate the 
schools and the militant defiance of many of the state’s citizens. Marable, supra note 12, 
at 42–43; Wormser, supra note 16, at 183. However, the willingness of the federal executive 
to help in the struggle for equality should not be overstated. In fact while the executive 
branch was helpful in some ways, it actively worked to thwart equality movements in other 
ways. The FBI’s Efforts to Disrupt and Neutralize the Black Panther Party, in The Eyes on the 
Prize Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, and Firsthand Accounts from 
the Black Freedom Struggle 529 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1991) (describing and 
documenting the way the FBI worked to disrupt and neutralize the Black Panther Party 
during the 1960s and early 1970s). 
37 For example, a 1942 survey showed that 51% of Americans surveyed favored segre-
gated streetcars and buses, but by 1970, 88% favored integrated streetcars and buses. Paul 
M. Kellstedt, The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes 2, 4 
(2003). Similarly, the same survey found that prior to the 1970s, 68% favored segregated 
schools and 55% favored active job discrimination. Id. at 2. By 1972, 97% favored equal 
employment opportunity for blacks and by 1995, 96% favored integrated schools. Id. at 4. 
But see John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The 
Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in Confronting Racism: The Prob-
lem and the Response 3 ( Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998) (describing 
how despite the apparent sea change in attitudes, many Americans are still biased). 
38 David O. Sears, Racism and Politics in the United States, in Confronting Racism, supra 
note 37, at 76, 80 (stating the general consensus is that “old fashioned racism” and “oppo-
sition to general principles of equality” have largely disappeared); Tristin K. Green, Dis-
crimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 
38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 91, 91 & n.1 (2003) (describing how discrimination in today’s 
workplace operates “less as a blanket policy or discrete, identifiable decision” and citing 
several scholars who “have documented this shift in the nature of discrimination”); Susan 
Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Obser-
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significant enough that a good portion of white America no longer be-
lieves discrimination is still a problem in American society.39 Once the 
blatant forms of discrimination began to recede and more and more 
segments of society began to engage in formal practices of equality, it 
became apparent that the Second Reconstruction did have something 
in common with the first; in the wake of the Second Reconstruction, as 
with the first, subordination and discrimination remained. 
 While the law said all people were now equal and many professed 
that they believed it to be so, many of the accoutrements of true equal-
ity were missing. Those allowed into jobs they had previously been de-
nied found it hard to move up once they gained entry, or found them-
selves the subjects of differential treatment and harassment.40 While 
things on the whole did improve for previously subordinated groups, 
members of those groups were certainly not equal. Minorities and 
women still found themselves overrepresented in the lower rungs of 
society—disproportionately holding the worst jobs if they held jobs at 
all,41 living in poorer conditions,42 and receiving an inferior educa-
tion.43 At the same time, they were underrepresented in the best jobs,44 
best neighborhoods,45 and best educational institutions.46 Not only 
that, demands to continue to move forward were increasingly met with 
                                                                                                                      
vations, 1 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 639, 641 (1998) (explaining that while deliberate exclu-
sion may not be obsolete, modern patterns of exclusion are more subtle). 
39 Sears, supra note 38, at 81 (“Most whites believe that discrimination has been greatly 
reduced and that equal opportunity does in fact exist.”). 
40 See, e.g., Fed. Glass Ceiling Comm’n, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Good for Business: 
Making Full Use of the Nation’s Human Capital 7–8 (1995), available at http://www. 
dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/reich/reports/ceiling.pdf. 
41 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Census 2000 EEO Data Tool, 
http://www.census.gov/eeo2000/index.html (select “Employment by Census Occupation 
Codes and Earnings” and click “Next” button; select “US Total” and click “Next” button; 
select “Total Employed at Work” from list of occupation categories, select “Show Detailed 
Race/Ethnicity Categories” from list of race categories, select “Show Total of Selected Ge-
ographies and Occupations” from list of output options, and click “Display table” button) 
(indicating that minorities and women are disproportionately represented in the lowest 
level of jobs as indicated by median earnings for particular occupations); see Derrick 
Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice 47 (1987). 
42 U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Ser. P23-205, Current Popula-
tion Reports: Population Profile of the United States: 1999, at 30–31 & 31 fig.7-3 
(2001) [hereinafter U.S. Population Profile: 1999], available at http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2001pubs/p23-205.pdf. 
43 Id. at 39 & fig.9-2. However, it should be noted that, while a numerical minority, 
Asians and Pacific Islanders have the highest educational attainments of all groups in the 
census report. Id. at 39. 
44 See supra note 41. 
45 U.S. Population Profile: 1999, supra note 42, at 28–32. 
46 Id. at 36–39. 
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resistance as challenges to affirmative action grew and support for civil 
rights waned.47 Thus, while the outcome of the Second Reconstruction 
was certainly better than the first, the promises of that era have still 
gone largely unfulfilled. The persistence of inequality and subordina-
tion in this country can be linked to a variety of factors. Be this as it 
may, at least one significant factor is the inherent shortcoming of the 
legal system meant to help address and eradicate this problem. Specifi-
cally, our legal system as currently constructed is inadequate for the 
task of eradicating persistent inequality and subordination, at least in 
part because it is derived from a faulty perspective with respect to the 
persistent nature of subordination and inequality in this country. 
B. The Current Perspective 
 There are many situations in which a person can suffer discrimina-
tion that are actionable under current law.48 However, for purposes of 
making this discussion manageable, my primary focus will be on dis-
crimination in employment and how it is addressed under both statu-
tory and constitutional law.49 There are essentially five potential ave-
nues open to an employee or potential employee who feels that he or 
she has been discriminated against. A brief review of these avenues and 
how they have been applied recently provides insight into the concept 
of discrimination that underlies them. 
                                                                                                                      
47 Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That 
Formed the Movement 103–04 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
48 For example, possible claims are available for discrimination with respect to hous-
ing, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000); voting, id. § 1973; and employment and education, id. § 245. 
49 The purpose of this portion of the discussion is to illustrate the perspective that un-
derlies antidiscrimination jurisprudence. While the nature of how one brings a claim may 
differ somewhat depending on the type of discrimination at issue, the underlying perspec-
tive behind all antidiscrimination laws is essentially the same regardless of the type of 
claim. Because the laws and constitutional provisions addressing employment discrimina-
tion are fairly comprehensive and lend themselves well to illustrating the point I intend to 
make here, I have chosen to focus on those to make this portion of the discussion more 
manageable. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme 
Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279, 285 (1997) (stating that there is no substantial difference 
in how the Supreme Court approaches discrimination issues whether they are statutory or 
constitutional). 
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1. Title VII claims 50 
 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act51 is the primary federal law 
addressing employment discrimination. While other laws such as the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)52 and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA)53 address discrimination with respect to 
categories not covered under Title VII, the theories under which a per-
son might bring a claim under those acts largely mirror those of Title 
VII.54 Under Title VII and its state law counterparts, when an action is 
not discriminatory on its face, there are three theories of discrimina-
tion available to a potential plaintiff: disparate treatment,55 disparate 
impact,56 and harassment.57 However, for any of these theories to offer 
redress, a person must first demonstrate that he or she fits into a pro-
tected category covered by the Act.58 Even if a plaintiff can demonstrate 
blatant and even horrible discrimination on the basis of a particular 
characteristic or trait, for example obesity or sexual orientation, he or 
                                                                                                                      
50 To the extent that a state also has its own antidiscrimination laws that mirror and are 
interpreted similarly to Title VII, much of what I say here will be applicable to state law 
claims as well. 
51 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. 
52 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634. 
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. 
54 However, the theories available are not necessarily identical. For example, while dis-
parate impact claims may be available under the ADEA, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that such claims are narrower in scope than under Title VII. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 
U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (“[D]ifferences between the ADEA and Title VII make it clear that 
even though both statutes authorize recovery on a disparate-impact theory, the scope of 
disparate-impact liability under ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.”). Additionally, the 
ADA allows for an employee to recover for failure to accommodate a disability. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(b)(5)(A). Title VII only has a similar provision for discrimination on the basis of 
religion. Id. § 2000e(j). 
55 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973) (stating the ele-
ments of a prima facie case and allocation of proof for disparate treatment cases). Al-
though the McDonnell Douglas Court did not specifically refer to the type of discrimination 
in that case as “disparate treatment,” that is the name such claims have been given over 
time. See Bell, supra note 15, at 643–45; Mark A. Rothstein & Lance Liebman, Employ-
ment Law 282–85 (5th ed. 2003). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(C); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 
642, 645–46 (1989); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
57 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–54 (1998); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–67 
(1986). 
58 Title VII states specifically that it only prohibits discrimination on the bases of race, 
sex, religion, color, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(d); see also Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2002) (indicating that the first element in a prima 
facie case of disparate treatment based on circumstantial evidence is that the plaintiff show 
that he or she is a member of a protected group). 
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she will not be able to obtain redress under current law unless that per-
son can make the characteristic in question fit into a protected cate-
gory.59 Thus, Title VII is not a general civility code and it does not pro-
tect a person from all forms of discrimination. 
 Once a person has met the threshold requirement of fitting into a 
protected category, the next task is to establish discrimination on the 
basis of that particular characteristic. In situations where a person has 
been treated differently and detrimentally from similarly situated oth-
ers, she may have a disparate treatment claim.60 When a person has not 
been specifically treated differently but has suffered a differential effect 
due to an employer’s policy or practice, the proper avenue is a dispa-
rate impact claim.61 Lastly, one who is subjected to a differential work-
ing environment because of a particular protected characteristic, such 
as when a woman is the object of lewd gestures or subjected to jokes or 
other conduct that alters her terms and conditions of employment, 
may have a claim for harassment.62 
 Obviously, this is a cursory and simplified rendition of the way a 
person may prove a discrimination claim under Title VII,63 but, as 
stated, what is currently required to prove a discrimination claim is only 
important to this discussion to the extent that it provides insight into 
the underlying concept of discrimination. Under each of the above de-
scribed theories, a plaintiff must not only show that he or she fits into a 
protected category, but that the basis for the alleged discrimination was 
                                                                                                                      
59 For example, the plaintiff in Whaley v. Southwest Student Transportation, clearly lost her 
job because of her obesity, but lost her case on a motion for summary judgment because 
the court found that her obesity did not qualify as a disability under the ADA. See No. 7:01-
CV-034, 2002 WL 999382, at *2, *3 (N.D. Tex. May 9, 2002). In contrast, the plaintiff in 
Butterfield v. New York, was able to survive summary judgment on his ADA claim over the 
disputed fact of whether his morbid obesity constituted a disability, but was unable to bring 
a Title VII claim for harassment due to his weight as he did not fit into a protected cate-
gory. See No. 7:96-CV-05144, 1998 WL 401533, at *13, *19 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1998). Simi-
larly, in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., the plaintiff was ultimately able to survive a grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant on his sexual harassment claim despite the fact that 
the harassment he endured was largely because of his sexual orientation because the court 
found that “[t]he physical attacks to which Rene was subjected, which targeted body parts 
clearly linked to his sexuality, were ‘because of . . . sex.’” 305 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
60 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see Bell, supra note 15, at 643–45; Rothstein & 
Liebman, supra note 55, at 282–85. 
61 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(C); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 645–46; Griggs, 401 U.S. 
at 431. 
62 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786; Burlington, 524 U.S. at 751–54; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63–67. 
63 For a more detailed discussion, see Green, supra note 38, at 112–26. 
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that protected category.64 In other words, one must show that the par-
ticular act in question was motivated, at least in part, by animus toward 
a protected characteristic.65 Additionally, one can usually only recover 
when he or she has suffered some kind of identifiable tangible harm.66 
Thus, the law only applies after the act of discrimination has occurred. 
2. Equal Protection and Due Process Claims 
 For those employees working in the public sector, equal protection 
and due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment may also be 
available to address claims of discrimination.67 Arguably, such claims, 
when available, are broader in scope in that one need not fit into a spe-
cific protected category in order to bring such a claim. For example, a 
homosexual person, similarly situated with respect to her coworkers but 
treated differently from them, may have a cognizable equal protection 
claim.68 Because homosexuality is not currently a protected category 
                                                                                                                      
64 See sources cited supra notes 58–62. 
65 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240–41 (1989); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (“[An] unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for 
any employment practice . . . .”). 
66 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (noting that the third 
element of a prima facie case for disparate impact is “an adverse employment action”); 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (stating that a violation of 
Title VII can be found when a “facially neutral employment practice[] . . . [has] significant 
adverse effects on protected groups”) (emphasis omitted); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (not-
ing that an adverse employment action must be shown whether the defendant is a private 
employer or a government agency). 
67 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Due to early interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment restricting its application only to situations involving state action, such claims 
are generally only available to employees working in the public sector. See The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1875). 
While claims under the federal Constitution are restricted to state action, that is not neces-
sarily the case for all state constitutions. See, e.g., Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 
618, 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that California state constitutional provisions pro-
tecting privacy applied to private employers). However, while these state provisions may 
reach more broadly, as with Title VII, the underlying concept of discrimination that guides 
their application does not differ from that underlying application of the federal constitu-
tional provisions. 
68 Quinn v. Nassau County Police Dep’t, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350, 356–58 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999) (upholding a $380,000 verdict for the plaintiff on a sexual harassment claim based 
on the plaintiff’s sexual orientation brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment after applying the rational basis test). But see High Tech Gays v. 
Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 568, 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding 
cognizable an equal protection claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment regarding the Department of Defense’s policies of requiring expanded investigations 
and mandatory adjudications as well as refusing to grant security clearances to known or 
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under Title VII, no such claim would be available under that law. Simi-
larly, one may have a due process claim for violation of a right regard-
less of the nature of the motivation underlying deprivation of that 
right.69 In other words, the underlying motivations that will sustain a 
constitutional due process claim are much broader than those that 
would sustain a Title VII claim. Yet, regardless of these differences, 
equal protection and due process claims are still similar to Title VII 
claims in that to prevail, a person must show causation and specific 
harm, both of which are addressed after the fact. 
3. The Perspective Underlying Our Current Antidiscrimination 
Regime 
 This somewhat quick review of the statutory and constitutional 
schemes for combating discrimination provides the basis from which 
we can infer the concept of discrimination or equality that underlies 
these laws. First and foremost, as several commentators have already 
clearly demonstrated, the law envisions discrimination largely as some-
thing purposely, intentionally, and consciously done.70 This underlying 
                                                                                                                      
suspected gay applicants, but upholding the policies and practices under a rational basis 
test). 
69 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 595, 598 (1972) (reversing grant of sum-
mary judgment to defendant school on plaintiff’s claim that the school’s refusal to rehire 
him infringed his right to free speech, and noting that “a teacher’s public criticism of his 
superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally protected and may, there-
fore, be an impermissible basis for termination of his employment”). 
70 See, e.g., Green, supra note 38, at 112 (“[The d]isparate treatment doctrine has long 
been understood to require a showing of intentional discrimination, often defined in 
terms of conscious motivation to discriminate.”); Justin D. Cummins, Refashioning the Dis-
parate Treatment and Disparate Impact Doctrines in Theory and in Practice, 41 How. L.J. 455, 459 
(1998) (“Antidiscrimination law . . . in accordance with the disparate treatment doctrine 
. . . only recognizes conscious acts of discrimination . . . .”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1177 (1995) (“[C]ourts have construed section 703 of 
Title VII, like 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983, to require proof of intent to discriminate 
in disparate treatment cases.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 318 (1987) (explaining how the 
Supreme Court decision of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), established the dis-
criminatory purpose doctrine which “requires plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality 
of a facially neutral law to prove a racially discriminatory purpose on the part of those 
responsible for the law’s enactment or administration”); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing 
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doc-
trine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049, 1054–55 (1978) (“[O]nly ‘intentional’ discrimination violates 
the antidiscrimination principle.”). But see Selmi, supra note 49, at 286–89 (agreeing that 
the Supreme Court requires a showing of intent, but that the focus of the Court’s inquiry 
when addressing the issue of intent centers on “whether race [or another protected cate-
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premise is further evident in the jurisprudence regarding mixed motive 
cases under Title VII, particularly with respect to the fact that a defen-
dant’s liability is less if part of the motive is permissible, even if dis-
criminatory motive has clearly been shown.71 Second, not only is dis-
crimination something that is purposely, intentionally, and consciously 
done, such action often will only result in liability if it can be shown that 
one’s intentional and conscious action was motivated by the victim’s 
membership in a designated protected category.72 As stated, a person 
who is the victim of blatant and even awful discrimination or inequality 
on the basis of something other than a specific category identified un-
der the law generally will have no redress for that harm.73 
 Third, this perspective is informed by the idea that equality exists 
when everyone is treated the same in a given situation, or put differ-
ently, when race or other protected categories are not taken into ac-
count.74 Thus, if in fact a particular person has a differential experi-
ence because of a unique personal quality or characteristic, but 
technically the standards applied to that person are “the same,” there is 
no cognizable claim for discrimination, a point which Professor Bar-
bara Flagg illustrates well in her article Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for 
Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking.75 In that piece, Professor 
Flagg presents a hypothetical situation detailing the differential treat-
ment two black sisters received at their respective places of work. One, 
Yvonne, was an accountant at a major nationwide accounting firm.76 In 
                                                                                                                      
gory] made a difference in the decisionmaking process,” an inquiry targeting causation 
rather than the actor’s subjective mental state). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000); see also Desert Palace Inc., v. Costa, 539 U.S. 
90, 94–95 (2003) (explaining that in a mixed motive case, an employer has an affirmative 
defense that, while not absolving it of liability, restricts the remedies available to the plain-
tiff). 
72 However, as mentioned previously, while one has to fit into a protected category for 
Title VII purposes and under similar statutory provisions such as the ADA and ADEA, in 
some instances the scope of constitutional provisions is somewhat broader. See supra notes 
67–69 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
74 Often presented by critics as the “race-neutral” or “colorblind” view, this view asserts 
that equality has been achieved when the law makes no differentiation or acknowledge-
ment of race, or other protected category. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution 
Is Color-Blind,” in Critical Race Theory, supra note 47, at 257, 268–72 (explaining that a 
color-blind approach has been put forth as the “proper” attitude toward race, but also 
explaining the limits and problems in that approach). See generally Michael K. Brown et 
al., Whitewashing Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind Society (2003). 
75 See generally Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Sub-
jective Decisionmaking, 104 Yale L.J. 2009 (1995). 
76 Id. at 2009. 
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this scenario, Yvonne was a well-qualified individual who largely con-
formed to existing norms in her profession and within the corporate 
culture of her workplace, including the norm of estimating time spent 
on client accounts and erring on the side of overbilling.77 When it 
came time for Yvonne to be promoted to regional manager, she was 
passed over for promotion due to the imprecise manner in which she 
had billed certain clients.78 Yvonne was passed over despite the fact that 
she engaged in practices similar—if not identical—to other members 
of the firm, who were not held accountable for their equally shoddy 
recordkeeping.79 As Flagg points out, although she may not win, 
Yvonne would have a cognizable claim under existing antidiscrimina-
tion doctrine because she is being treated differently from similarly 
situated others.80 
 In contrast, Yvonne’s sister, Keisha Akbar, did not assimilate to pre-
vailing norms to the extent that Yvonne did. Apart from legally chang-
ing her name from Deborah Taylor, Keisha also adopted speech and 
grooming patterns consistent with her African heritage.81 Working as 
the only black scientist in a small research firm, Keisha did well at the 
technical aspects of her job, but was ultimately not promoted when the 
small firm began to expand because she was thought to lack the per-
sonal qualities needed to be an effective manager; namely, she was seen 
as being too different from the researchers she would supervise.82 
While Keisha suffered differential treatment like Yvonne, Flagg ex-
plains that Keisha is much less likely to have a cognizable discrimina-
tion claim because, unlike Yvonne, Keisha is treated the same as her 
coworkers; the same norms are being applied to her as to everyone 
else, and she is arguably being treated the same as anyone who fails to 
conform to those norms.83 Despite the fact that Keisha’s unwillingness 
to conform to those norms is directly linked to her identity as a black 
woman, and thus arguably results in a difference in treatment based on 
her race, the discrimination Keisha experienced is not the type for 
which current antidiscrimination law provides redress.84 
                                                                                                                      
77 Id. at 2009–10. 
78 Id. at 2010. 
79 Id. 
80 Flagg, supra note 75, at 2012, 2013, 2014. 
81 Id. at 2010–11. 
82 Id. at 2011. 
83 Id. at 2012. 
84 Id. at 2013–15; see also Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theo-
ries Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2370, 2407–08 (1994) (ex-
plaining how victims of cultural domination, such as victims of English-only rules, have not 
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 Fourth, this perspective is informed by the idea that discrimination 
is an abnormality or rarity, rather than the norm.85 Put simply, the un-
derlying assumption is that the employer has acted for permissible mo-
tives and the workplace is not discriminatory. Several of the major Su-
preme Court antidiscrimination cases evidence this point. For example, 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio involved a disparate impact case in 
which employees challenged the composition of the employer’s work-
force in which nonwhites predominated in the less-skilled, lower-paying 
jobs.86 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that hiring and promotion 
practices of the employer were responsible for the racial stratification 
of the workforce.87 In finding against the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court 
first explained that the proper comparison for analysis was not the dis-
crepancy between the cannery and noncannery workforce within the 
particular employer, but rather the pool of qualified applicants versus 
those holding a particular position.88 Thus, the plaintiffs could not es-
tablish a prima facie case of disparate impact on the basis of comparing 
segments of the employer’s own workforce.89 Furthermore, although 
not necessary to the decision, the Court went on to clarify a few other 
points, the most important for this discussion being the issue of causa-
tion. Specifically, the Court made clear that even if properly deter-
mined, it would not be enough to demonstrate an imbalanced work-
force to prevail on a disparate impact claim.90 Rather, in addition to 
                                                                                                                      
been successful in seeking redress from the courts since their harm is regarded as due to 
their own choices, rather than them being victims of an exclusionary workplace culture). 
85 See Krieger, supra note 70, at 1167 (“[D]isparate treatment analysis assumes that, 
unless they harbor discriminatory intent or motive, decisionmakers will act objectively and 
judge rationally.”); Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 587, 590 (2000) (describing what she terms the “meritocracy 
myth” which reflects dominant cultural assumptions, the first of which being “that em-
ployment discrimination is an anomaly”); Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protec-
tion: The Jurisprudence of Denial and Evasion, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 1307, 1314 (1991) (“[E]qual 
protection jurisprudence reflects a society that merely rebukes accidental manifestations of 
prejudice, condemning them as social blunders rather than recognizing them as symptoms 
of a deeper societal pathology.”); Sturm, supra note 38, at 672 (“The law appears to assume 
that, absent racist or sexist motivation, race and gender identity does not enter into work-
place decision making . . . .”); see also Freeman, supra note 70, at 1103 (explaining that 
jurisprudence views discriminatory acts as “the occasional aberrational practice”). 
86 490 U.S. 642, 647 (1989). Jobs at the canneries at issue were divided into two pri-
mary types, cannery and noncannery jobs. Id. The cannery jobs were unskilled, paid less 
than the skilled noncannery jobs, and were predominantly filled by nonwhites. Id. In con-
trast, the noncannery jobs were skilled positions filled predominantly by whites. Id. 
87 Id. at 647–48. 
88 Id. at 651–52. 
89 Id. at 654–55. 
90 Id. at 656–57. 
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establishing an imbalance, the plaintiff would also have to show that 
the particular disparate impact was created by a specific or particular 
employment practice.91 To the extent an employee is unable to make 
this causal link, the employee’s claim will fail. Hence, unless an em-
ployee can show that an employer has created a racial imbalance 
through some specific and identifiable practice, the employee will not 
be able to establish a claim of disparate impact discrimination under 
the law. In other words, there is no disparate impact discrimination. 
Thus, the assumption is that, unless specifically shown otherwise, the 
workplace is free from discrimination such that an employer enjoys a 
presumption of legitimacy. 
 Furthermore, discrimination is only actionable when the victim 
has experienced some tangible effect.92 Thus, there are no proactive 
claims available under the current system. An employer who is engag-
ing in discriminatory practices is free to do so under this presumption 
of legitimacy. The law applies only after a specific instance of discrimi-
nation occurs to which an employee or potential employee can refer.93 
Even at that juncture, the presumption of legitimacy remains unless the 
plaintiff can show by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a 
specific act or instance of discrimination based on an impermissible 
motive that caused an identifiable harm to that particular individual or 
group of individuals.94 Accordingly, pursuant to this view, equality and 
fairness are the embedded norms and discrimination is the anomaly. 
 The above perspective on equality and the legal system it has en-
gendered has done fairly well combating blatant forms of discrimina-
tion, so much so that some believe discrimination and subordination 
are largely a thing of the past.95 However, subtle, unconscious, and un-
                                                                                                                      
91 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656–57. Although amendments to Title VII, in the form of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat 1071, 1074–75, over-
turned this portion of the decision to the extent that the Court in Wards Cove required an 
employee to disaggregate the particular offending employment practice, those amend-
ments did not relieve the employee of the requirement of providing a direct causal link 
from the employment practice at issue and the disparate impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)–(B) (2000). 
92 Freeman, supra note 70, at 1056. 
93 See supra text accompanying note 66. 
94 See supra text accompanying notes 70–73. 
95 Brown et al., supra note 74, at 1–9; Crenshaw, supra note 47, at 103 (“The position 
of the New Right . . . is that the goal of the civil rights movement—the extension of formal 
equality to all Americans regardless of color—has already been achieved, hence the vision 
of a continuing struggle under the banner of civil rights is inappropriate.”); Freeman, 
supra note 70, at 1103 (noting that many believe the “future society,” where discrimination 
is the anomaly, is already here); Lawton, supra note 85, at 594 (“A majority of white Ameri-
cans do not believe that race discrimination affects employment opportunities for black 
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intentional discrimination still persists. For this reason, several scholars 
have put forth proposals for how to address these other forms of dis-
crimination under the law.96 These proposals demonstrate a few key 
shifts in the traditional underlying perspective. 
II. Recent Innovative Attempts to Use the Law to Combat the 
Problem of Persistent Inequality and Subordination 
 For the last several decades, psychologists have explored the social 
and psychological processes that lead to prejudice, discrimination, and 
inequality.97 As a result, researchers have gained valuable and sometimes 
startling insights that help explain why discrimination and inequality 
persist despite the demise of more blatant forms of discrimination and 
the large number of people claiming to be in support of equality.98 Es-
sentially, they described the preference for one’s own group versus those 
of an outside group and how categorization and stereotyping, though 
part of efficient cognitive functioning, can result in unconscious bias 
that affects one’s judgment of, perception of, and interaction with oth-
ers as well as the ability to remember events.99 
 Recognizing the persistence of discrimination in the wake of the 
Second Reconstruction and realizing that our laws and current antidis-
crimination system were ineffective in sufficiently addressing the prob-
lem, legal scholars seized on the work of psychologists and began to 
theorize about unconscious and structural discrimination and how the 
law might be used to address it.100 A review of these theories is to where 
this article now turns. 
                                                                                                                      
Americans in today’s market.”); Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective 
Rather Than Intent, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 657, 662–63 (2003). 
96 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
97 See generally The Handbook of Social Psychology (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 
4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter Gilbert et al., Handbook]; On The Nature of Prejudice 
( John F. Dovidio, et al. eds., 2005); Stereotypes and Prejudice (Charles Stangor ed., 
2000); The Handbook of Social Psychology (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); 
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism ( John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 
1986). 
98 See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 37, at 4–8 (describing how racism persists in 
our society despite a change in overt measures of racial attitudes that show an increase in 
the belief in equality due to a more subtle form of modern racial bias known as aversive 
racism). 
99 See id. at 5–6. A comprehensive review of the wealth of this scholarship is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but for detailed overviews, see Handbook of Social Psychology 
( John Delamater ed., 2003) [hereinafter Delamater, Handbook]; Gilbert et al., Hand-
book, supra note 97, at 371–372; Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism, supra note 97, 
at 128–133; Stereotypes and Prejudice, supra note 97. 
100 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
284 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:263 
A. New Proposals 
 In his seminal article The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, Professor Charles Lawrence brought the prob-
lem of unconscious discrimination and inherent bias to the attention of 
the legal world.101 Relying on psychological theory, in particular Freu-
dian and cognitive theories, he explained that all of us are influenced 
by a racist cultural heritage and, because of this influence, we are all 
racists to a certain extent.102 However, at the same time, most of us are 
unaware of our racism and, as a result, engage in behavior that pro-
duces racial discrimination influenced by unconscious, racial motiva-
tion.103 Accordingly, Lawrence sought in his article to challenge the 
doctrine of discriminatory purpose established by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Washington v. Davis.104 He explained: 
[A doctrine] requiring proof of conscious or intentional mo-
tivation as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a 
decision is race-dependent ignores much of what we under-
stand about how the human mind works. It also disregards 
both the irrationality of racism and the profound effect that 
the history of American race relations has had on the individ-
ual and collective unconscious.105 
Given this, he proposed a “cultural meaning” test to address uncon-
scious bias.106 Under this test, a particular government action would be 
evaluated to see if it “conveys a symbolic message to which the culture 
attaches racial significance.”107 If the court were to find by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that a significant portion of the population 
would think of the action in racial terms, then a presumption would 
arise that unconscious racial attitudes had influenced the decisionmak-
ers and the court would therefore apply heightened scrutiny.108 In this 
way, equal protection law would be more responsive to pervasive and 
unconscious discrimination.109 
                                                                                                                      
101 See generally Lawrence, supra note 70. 
102 Id. at 322, 331–39. 
103 Id. at 322, 339–44. 
104 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976); Lawrence, supra note 70, at 318–19. 
105 Lawrence, supra note 70, at 323. 
106 Id. at 324. 
107 Id. at 324, 355–56. 
108 Id. at 356. 
109 Id. at 362–81 (containing illustrations for how the cultural meaning test would ap-
ply). 
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 Since Lawrence’s article, several scholars have also put forth pro-
posals to make antidiscrimination law more responsive to the ways in 
which modern discrimination manifests itself. For example, Professor 
Oppenheimer proposed the adoption of a negligence theory of liability 
under Title VII.110 In so doing, he likened the disparate treatment and 
impact theories of Title VII liability to intentional and strict liability 
theories in tort.111 He explained, however, that the work of social psy-
chologists and sociologists lends considerable support to the idea that 
racial discrimination is frequently the result of negligent behavior.112 
Accordingly, he proposed a negligence theory of Title VII liability 
whereby employers would be liable if they failed to act to prevent dis-
crimination that they knew, should have known, expected, or should 
have expected to occur, or when they breached a statutorily established 
standard of care by “making employment decisions which have a dis-
criminatory effect, without first scrutinizing their processes, searching 
for less discriminatory alternatives, and examining their own motives 
for evidence of stereotyping.”113 Apart from arguing that a negligence 
theory of liability would be more in line with the scientific data on dis-
crimination,114 Oppenheimer also justified the proposal to impose neg-
ligence liability on the grounds that antidiscrimination doctrine already 
incorporated many aspects of negligence theory with respect to doc-
trines governing claims of harassment and those requiring accommo-
dation of religious practices, pregnancy, and disabilities.115 Thus, it was 
but a small step to impose negligence liability, a better system for ad-
dressing unconscious bias.116 
 Linda Hamilton Krieger also focused on the work of psychologists 
in her groundbreaking work The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity.117 
However, unlike Lawrence and Oppenheimer, Krieger used psycho-
logical theory to do more than argue the existence of unconscious bias 
                                                                                                                      
110 David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 899, 899 
(1993). 
111 Id. at 899, 920–21, 924–25. 
112 Id. at 902–17. 
113 Id. at 969–70. 
114 Id. at 967. 
115 Oppenheimer, supra note 110, at 939 (religious practices); 942–43 (pregnancy); 
944 (disabilities); 948, 950 (racial harassment); 959, 962, 966–67 (sexual harassment). 
116 Id. at 969–72. But see generally Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 
1129 (1999) (arguing that unconscious bias should be addressed through an expansion of 
Title VII). 
117 Krieger, supra note 70, at 1165. 
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as something the law should address. Instead of just speaking generally 
about the existence of unconscious bias, Krieger articulated the specific 
ways in which normal cognitive functioning can lead to biased percep-
tion and decisionmaking.118 She then illustrated what that meant with 
respect to Title VII’s ability to adequately address workplace discrimina-
tion.119 
 First, Krieger pointed out that under disparate treatment theory 
and, in particular, the pretext model, a defendant is assumed to have 
acted rationally and without discriminatory animus.120 However, as 
Krieger makes clear, psychologists have shown that “implicit knowledge 
structures and judgmental heuristics systematically bias perception and 
judgment at all points along the perceptual/judgment continuum.”121 
Thus, decisions by those with even the best of intentions are often the 
result of intergroup bias.122 Accordingly, the insistence on only address-
ing discrimination where motive or intent are shown allows many in-
stances of discrimination to go unaddressed. 
 Second, Krieger explained that disparate treatment theory also 
rests on the assumption that discrimination occurs at the moment a 
decision is made.123 However, psychological study has also demon-
strated that this is not the case. Rather, interpersonal decisionmaking is 
an integrated process of several components that happens over time.124 
Thus, while Title VII only addresses discrimination if intent or motive is 
found at the time of decision, in reality, cognitive functioning can taint 
the process long before the actual decision is made.125 Lastly, Title VII 
rests on the assumption that decisionmakers are aware of the basis for 
their decisions.126 However, as with the previous two assumptions, psy-
chological research shows that this is not likely the case; in fact, the op-
posite may more often be true.127 
 After showing that much of Title VII disparate treatment jurispru-
dence rested on faulty assumptions about human cognitive functioning 
and the causes of discrimination, Krieger proposed that “[t]he pretext 
model of individual disparate treatment [theory should] be eliminated 
                                                                                                                      
118 Id. at 1187–88. 
119 Id. at 1211. 
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entirely and replaced with a unitary ‘motivating factor’ analysis.”128 
Under a “motivating factor” analysis, a plaintiff could prevail on a dis-
parate treatment claim by simply showing that her group status played a 
role—in other words, “made a difference” —in the employer’s action 
or decision.129 If the defendant were then able to show that it would 
have made the same decision absent the biasing effect of the plaintiff’s 
group status, the plaintiff would be limited to the remedies available for 
disparate impact cases.130 However, if the plaintiff could show proof of 
the defendant’s conscious use of group status, she would be entitled to 
compensatory and punitive damages as well.131 Thus, under this ap-
proach, the law would take account of the fact that discrimination can 
arise absent discriminatory intent or purposeful causation.132 
 Like Lawrence, Oppenheimer, and Krieger, other commentators 
have focused on the unconscious nature of discrimination and the law’s 
inability to adequately address discrimination of this type. However, in 
so doing, these scholars have focused more on inherent structural 
problems that facilitate or perpetuate discrimination rather than indi-
vidual cognitive or psychological processes. For example, Professor 
Susan Sturm has illustrated that the nature of the current workplace 
has changed.133 In most situations, gone are the days of traditional, top-
down, hierarchical structures.134 Instead, more and more workplaces 
are characterized by a flatter form of decisionmaking where coworkers 
function as teams in increasingly mobile environments and where the 
lines between customers, clients, and suppliers are blurring.135 Because 
of the changes in the modern workplace, Sturm argues that the current 
legal system, largely based on the eroding traditional hierarchical struc-
ture, no longer allows us to adequately address the real ways that exclu-
sion, bias, and the exercise of power effect the modern workplace.136 
Accordingly, she proposes that we take a structural approach to antidis-
crimination law. This approach would call for “a dynamic and recipro-
cal relationship between judicially elaborated general legal norms and 
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130 Id. at 1243. 
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132 Krieger, supra note 70, at 1242. 
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workplace-generated problem-solving approaches”137 and would em-
body the underlying assumption that a problem-solving process rather 
than a rule-enforcement approach would better address current prob-
lems in the dynamic workplace.138 In a similar vein, Professor Tristin K. 
Green has also argued that the modern workplace has changed and 
that we accordingly need a new conceptualization of discrimination 
that will allow us to combat these modern forms.139 Lastly, Professor Ian 
F. Haney López, in his insightful article Institutional Racism: Judicial Con-
duct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, examines how inherently 
biased patterns and structures of decisionmaking and selection can 
create and perpetuate discrimination and subordination.140 
 The work of the scholars discussed in this section and others like 
them demonstrates a shift in the understanding of discrimination, ine-
quality, and subordination underlying our current antidiscrimination 
system. The following section explicates this shift as well as the differ-
ence from the traditional perspective it evidences. 
B. The Tweaking of the Traditional Perspective 
 As identified earlier, the perspective underlying our current anti-
discrimination system can be characterized as envisioning discrimina-
tion as something purposely or consciously done at a specific point in 
time on the basis of certain protected characteristics.141 It is a perspec-
tive that views equality as sameness in treatment and which largely does 
not countenance a proactive approach to eradicating the problem.142 It 
is a perspective that sees discrimination, subordination, and inequality 
as anomalies in an otherwise fair and rational system and as problems 
which can only be eradicated in the face of an identifiable tangible ef-
fect.143 The proposals for change discussed in the previous section144 
evidence key shifts in this perspective, but they also show a continued 
                                                                                                                      
137 Sturm, supra note 133, at 522. 
138 Id. at 475–78. 
139 See generally Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 623 
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belief in aspects of this perspective that are important as well. The fol-
lowing subsections highlight these differences and similarities. 
1. Differences in Perspective 
 The first major difference between the traditional perspective and 
the view of scholars like those discussed above is the belief on the part 
of the former that while discrimination can and does occur in the form 
of blatant and purposeful discrimination it can, and often does, occur 
in subtle and unconscious or unintended ways.145 In fact, it was pre-
cisely the recognition that not all discrimination and inequality is pur-
poseful that prompted many of these scholars to seek alternatives to 
our current system, alternatives that would address these unconscious 
forms of discrimination and bias.146 
 Second, the perspective evident in these scholars’ work also differs 
significantly from the traditional perspective in that several of them 
recognize that discrimination can and does occur at points other than 
at the moment of action.147 While discrimination may be present at the 
moment of action or with respect to a particular action, as they high-
light, bias can infect all parts of a particular situation or process.148 
 Third, although not necessarily articulated explicitly in each of 
their works, several of these scholars appear to hold a view of equality 
that goes beyond the formal equality and colorblindness that informs 
the current system.149 A strong argument can be made, which some of 
these scholars have asserted, that formal equality has largely been 
achieved.150 Thus, if that were sufficient, there would be no need to put 
forth the kinds of proposals they have because equality would already 
have been achieved. 
 Lastly, proposals such as those put forth by Sturm and Green, 
which would specifically and proactively address workplace discrimina-
tion through structural change, show a willingness to address inequality 
and discrimination absent a clearly identifiable tangible effect.151 Thus, 
the views informing their work evidence a significant shift in the tradi-
tional perspective underlying our antidiscrimination laws. 
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2. Similarities in Perspective 
 While the difference in perspective between these progressive 
scholars and the traditional view is significant, there are some impor-
tant similarities as well. First, while the underlying view of equality these 
scholars seem to adopt appears to be more expansive than that held 
under the traditional perspective, it is not clear how much more expan-
sive or different that view actually is. While it is pretty clear that formal 
equality, or simply equal access, without meaningful equality of result 
would not be enough for these scholars, they do not articulate a clear 
vision of what an equal and nondiscriminatory society would look like. 
Without that clear vision and an explanation of how their proposals do 
a better job of getting us to that ideal, these proposals lose some of 
their normative force.152 
 Second, while some of these scholars question the importance of 
and continued reliance on the protected categories we have in place,153 
few really question whether those categories should be primary con-
structs regarding the way we understand and address discrimination 
and inequality. Lastly, and most importantly, while perhaps not whole-
heartedly holding to the belief of discrimination as anomaly,154 none 
really challenge that belief or explore the implication for our entire 
antidiscrimination system if that underlying presumption is a faulty 
one. As a result, even with a shift in perspective and the resulting pro-
posals for reform, key components of the perspective underlying our 
current system remain intact and largely go unchallenged. 
 The scholars discussed and cited here and others like them, 
through their innovative and insightful ideas and desire to address a 
persistent and very difficult problem, have done much to advance our 
understanding of inequality and subordination within our society and 
the law’s role in both helping to perpetuate and to eradicate the persis-
tent problems of discrimination, subordination, and inequality. How-
ever, lack of a clearly articulated vision for what constitutes equality, or, 
in the converse, what constitutes inequality, as well as the absence of 
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significant challenge to the anomaly assumption and the continued use 
of categories, points to aspects of the problem that these scholars have 
overlooked. Failure to recognize these aspects of the problem necessar-
ily leads to a failure to address them and the attendant possibilities for 
meaningful change that addressing these aspects might present.155 
III. What Is Missing? 
 The proposals discussed above are informed by a more compre-
hensive and complex understanding of the problem of discrimination 
and subordination than the current norm, but there is a key aspect of 
this problem which even they are missing. This important, absent com-
ponent and the attendant change in perspective it engenders are ad-
dressed below. 
A. The Truth About Inequality and Discrimination in America 
It is easier for the world to accept a simple lie, than a complex truth. 
—attributed to Alexis de Tocqueville 
 On July 4, 1776, Thomas Jefferson, writing for a unanimous United 
States of America, declared: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with cer-
tain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the Pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these Rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any 
Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is 
the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to insti-
tute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Princi-
ples and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall 
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.156 
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With this declaration we took the first steps toward forming our own 
country in which equality and inalienable rights were to be the bedrock 
of the more perfect union we sought to form. Unfortunately, the more 
perfect union was from the beginning built on shaky ground, at least to 
the extent it might guarantee and deliver on the promise of equality to 
all men (not to mention women). 
1. Inequality Predates America 
 Over 100 years before the drafting of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the seeds for our longstanding inequality, subordination, 
and discrimination problem were sown. Beginning as early as 1565, the 
first Europeans began to colonize what would eventually become the 
United States of America.157 Over the next several years the number of 
colonists grew and the need for land increased.158 At the same time, the 
fertility of the American soil became more apparent and the profitabil-
ity of cultivating cash crops grew.159 However, the land the colonizers 
wanted was already occupied and the cheap labor they desired was not 
readily available.160 It was primarily this need for land and labor that 
catalyzed the subordinating regime that eventually became woven into 
nearly all aspects of the American fabric. 
 Historians have debated for decades the origins of chattel slavery 
in what eventually became the United States and the concomitant ideo-
logical regime of white supremacy, racism, and subordination.161 Some 
have argued that chattel slavery and the ideology of white supremacy 
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and nonwhite inferiority were present as early as the first record of 
blacks in the United States in 1619 Virginia.162 Others argue that the 
move to an ideology of racism and chattel slavery was more gradual 
over a longer period.163 Relying on records of freed blacks,164 the use of 
significant numbers of white servants,165 and the aversion to enslaving 
Christians regardless of color,166 these scholars argue that slavery and 
white supremacist ideology developed over time.167 Scholars in the lat-
ter camp also point to laws of that time, which present the intransi-
gence of the slave system as something that occurred gradually.168 Re-
gardless of which view one adopts, the important point is that chattel 
slavery and its accompanying ideology of white supremacy were firmly 
in place in certain areas of America as early as the 1660s and 1670s and 
became more firmly entrenched by the 1680s,169 thus predating the 
formation of the Union by roughly 100 years. 
 Similarly, the eventual belief in the right of whites to take Native 
American lands and to subjugate Native American people also appears 
to be something that developed over time without clear-cut origins.170 
Early records appear to present a mixed view among the Europeans 
regarding whether the land in North America was simply theirs for the 
taking.171 Some early settlers assumed property and sovereignty rights 
on the basis of “discovery” of “New World” lands as though the Native 
Americans were not there simply because they could be conquered.172 
Others justified the taking of land by claiming that Christians had the 
right, if not the duty, to take land from non-Christians.173 Still others 
justified their actions by asserting that Native Americans were a “savage” 
people who were not able to claim any property rights.174 
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 Be that as it may, there were many others, although by no means a 
unanimous group, who believed that the Native Americans did in fact 
own the land they occupied and that, at the very least, such land had to 
be acquired by purchase; it could not be taken without consent under 
English law.175 However, a belief in Native American land ownership 
was not necessarily accompanied by a belief in the equality of Native 
Americans.176 Nor was it void of a self-serving purpose on the part of 
the colonists for, ironically, the same laws that would have recognized 
land possession by the Native Americans were also the same laws that 
protected property rights in the claims made by the colonizers.177 Thus, 
while some North American colonizers may have recognized Native 
American property rights, they did so while at the same time viewing 
Native Americans as barbaric and uncivilized and rarely questioning 
their right to take Native American land.178 Further, as the number of 
colonizers increased and the need for land grew, more and more land 
was taken without even the fiction of purchase.179 
 In sum, the initial foundation for the United States grew out of the 
acquisition of land by European colonizers on the North American 
continent and the ability to make that land commercially productive 
through the use of cheap labor.180 Acquiring that land for next to noth-
ing and forcing people to work it for free required the development of 
an ideology that allowed for and justified the subordination and subju-
gation of groups of “others.” Thus, the seeds of inequality and subordi-
nation were sown into the American foundation long before 1776 and 
have only grown and matured since that time. 
2. The Framer’s View of Equality 
 Despite the fact that at its inception the United States was declared 
a nation of equals, the reality was that the ideology of white male supe-
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riority was alive and well before the nation’s founding, and permeated 
all aspects of American life despite declarations to the contrary. As 
Chief Justice Taney explained (more honestly than most): 
 In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of 
the times, and the language used in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, show, that neither the class of persons who had 
been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they 
had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of 
the people, nor intended to be included in the general words 
used in that memorable instrument. . . . 
 . . . . 
  [Paragraph two of the Declaration of Independence] 
would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they 
were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so un-
derstood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved Afri-
can race were not intended to be included, and formed no 
part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration 
. . . . 
. . . . 
 [The Framers] perfectly understood the meaning of the 
language they used, and how it would be understood by oth-
ers; and they knew that it would not in any part of the civilized 
world be supposed to embrace the negro race . . . . 181 
 Chief Justice Taney’s interpretation is supported by other histori-
cal documents and commentary of the time.182 For while some of the 
founders may have been ambivalent, opposed to slavery, or even ac-
cepting of blacks as men, they certainly did not see blacks as equal to 
whites.183 
 Thus, despite the principles upon which this country was founded, 
equality as viewed by the founders only included white men, and even 
then only white men with property and status. Poor people of all kinds, 
women generally, and anyone not considered white in particular were 
thought to be unequal and relegated to a subordinate status.184 Any 
doubts as to whether the founding fathers subscribed to these beliefs 
                                                                                                                      
181 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407, 410 (1857). 
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are belied by many of their actions, for who can own another man or 
woman and hold that person in bondage or servitude and at the same 
time see that person as equal? There are some scholars and historians 
who are quick to point out that, despite these shortcomings, the foun-
ders were not nearly as bad or as hypocritical as they are depicted in 
modern scholarship.185 However, even if the founders on some level 
did believe in the equality of all human beings, the need to make a 
profit on the backs of free labor superseded that belief.186 Further, the 
continuation of slavery and the belief in white superiority in the face of 
a bold declaration to the contrary meant the country would be 
founded on the basis of an inherent contradiction, and the subordina-
tion and inequality would continue, endure, and become part of the 
fundamental social fabric of America. 
3. Inequality and Subordination Are Embedded in the American 
Government Structure 
 In the same way that subordination and inequality were part and 
parcel of the foundation of this country and the views of the founders, 
they were also embedded into our structure of government and system 
of laws. The preeminent legal document in this country, the U.S. Con-
stitution, did not affirmatively allow women to vote until 1920, thus al-
                                                                                                                      
185 E.g., Thomas G. West, Vindicating the Founders: Race, Sex, Class, and Jus-
tice in the Origins of America, at xi–xv (1997). 
186 See Davis, supra note 182, at 196. 
 Would any one believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own purchase! I 
am drawn along by ye general Inconvenience of living without them; I will 
not, I cannot justify it. However culpable my conduct, I will so far pay my de-
voir to Virtue, as to own the excellence & rectitude of her Precepts & to la-
ment my want of conformity to them. 
Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants ( Jan. 18, 1773), in George S. Brookes, 
Friend Anthony Benezet 443 (1937), quoted in Davis, supra note 182, at 196. 
Jefferson’s record on slavery can only be judged by the values of his contem-
poraries and by the consistency between his own professed beliefs and ac-
tions. . . . One can understand and sympathize with his occasional feelings of 
despair, as when he wrote in 1820 that “we have a wolf by the ears, and we can 
neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-
preservation in the other.” But for Jefferson the scale tipped heavily toward 
self-preservation, which meant the preservation of a social order based on 
slavery. 
Davis, supra note 182, at 183. See generally Tania Tetlow, The Founders and Slavery: A Crises of 
Conscience, 3 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 1 (2001) (examining the role of self-interest in shaping 
ideology). 
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lowing for the disenfranchisement of over half of the population from 
the beginning.187 Similarly, the Constitution provided for the protec-
tion of slavery, be it directly or indirectly, in at least twelve places,188 and 
several other constitutional clauses ultimately served to protect the in-
stitution when they were interpreted by the courts or implemented by 
the executive.189 
 Accordingly, the “more perfect Union” the document was meant to 
form excluded or subordinated the majority of the individuals in that 
Union.190 Significant changes made nearly a century later in the form of 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments helped lessen 
the problems of inequality and subordination, but those amendments 
have not been able to eradicate the inequality and subordination em-
bedded at formation. This is due in no small part to the restrictive way 
in which the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted those sections shortly after 
their passage. 
 First, while the Thirteenth Amendment effectively abolished slav-
ery, the Supreme Court interpreted that amendment in such a way that 
it did little more than remove the shackles. When interpreting the 
amendment in the Civil Rights Cases,191 the Supreme Court made it 
clear that the incidents of slavery and servitude that the Thirteenth 
Amendment was meant to eradicate extended only to instances of 
“[c]ompulsory service . . . for the benefit of the master, restraint of . . . 
movement[] except by the master’s will, disability to hold property, to 
make contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a witness against a 
white person, and such like burdens and incapacities.”192 Consequently, 
the Court refused to accept the plaintiffs’ argument that denial of 
equal accommodations and privileges constituted subjection to a spe-
cies of servitude as contemplated by the Amendment.193 Stating clearly 
that “[m]ere discriminations on account of race or color were not re-
garded as badges of slavery,”194 the Court struck down the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 and greatly narrowed the scope of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment,195 pointing out that: 
                                                                                                                      
187 U.S. Const. amend. XIX. 
188 Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery 
Constitution, 32 Akron L. Rev. 423, 427–33 (1999). 
189 Id. at 426. 
190 U.S. Const. pmbl. 
191 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
192 Id. at 22. 
193 Id. at 23–25. 
194 Id. at 25. 
195 Id. 
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[t]here were thousands of free colored people in this country 
before the abolition of slavery . . . yet no one . . . thought that 
[slavery] was any invasion of his personal status as a freeman 
because he was not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by 
white citizens, or because he was subjected to discriminations 
in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public convey-
ances and places of amusement . . . .196 
Thus, while technically free, the recently freed slaves remained in a 
subordinated status as many of` the “badges” of slavery remained intact. 
 The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments fared little better. In 
the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court applied an extremely strict view of 
state versus national citizenship in asserting that citizenship of the 
United States was distinctly different from citizenship of the several 
states, and therefore section one of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
ferred only to citizens of the United States.197 Accordingly, the Four-
teenth Amendment did not protect the privileges and immunities 
found to fall within the purview of state power. The Court then defined 
state power as encompassing “nearly every civil right for the establish-
ment and protection of which organized government is instituted.”198 
In so doing, it effectively read the Privileges and Immunities Clause out 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and made it a nullity for all time.199 
Given that at least some of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
intended the Privileges and Immunities Clause to “protect basic rights 
from state interference,”200 the Supreme Court’s refusal to give it any 
meaningful content was no insignificant act in keeping subordination 
and inequality embedded in the Constitution. In a similar vein, the 
reach of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses were similarly 
limited from the outset by the Court’s ruling that they too only applied 
to state action,201 and by the Court’s determination that equality meant 
simple, formal equality before the law rather than equality in fact.202 
Additionally, the backlash to the Court’s strict adherence to freedom of 
contract doctrine, which served to protect certain classes to the detri-
                                                                                                                      
196 Id. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. 
197 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873). 
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ment of others, ultimately led to a reluctance to use substantive due 
process to address the deprivation of many rights.203 
 For similar reasons the Fifteenth Amendment was no more helpful 
than its counterparts. In construing the reach of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court once again took an extremely restric-
tive approach that essentially made the Fifteenth Amendment ineffec-
tual in securing for African Americans and other people of color the 
right to vote for several decades. In United States v. Reese, the Court 
stated that the Fifteenth Amendment did not actually confer the right 
of suffrage, but only created the right of an “exemption from discrimi-
nation in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, 
color, or previous conditions of servitude.”204 It confirmed that view in 
United States v. Cruikshank.205 Thus, the Supreme Court opened the 
door for the many methods of disenfranchisement that would follow; it 
effectively condoned the behavior at issue in both of those cases, such 
as refusing to accept William Gartner’s payment of the tax necessary to 
vote in Reese,206 and permitting the banding together with the intent to 
injure, threaten, and intimidate Levi Nelson and Alexander Tillman in 
Cruikshank.207 
 Ironically, even if the Supreme Court had read the Fifteenth 
Amendment in such a way as to make it effective, the Court still would 
have only allowed men to vote.208 Thus, all women (regardless of color 
or social status) would still have been disenfranchised, and the accom-
panying subordination would have still been embodied in our national 
Constitution. As a result, even with these attempts to rectify its short-
comings, subordination and inequality still remain embodied in the 
U.S. Constitution and have continued to be embedded in the very 
foundations of our country. 
4. Inequality and Subordination Are Embedded in Our Major 
Institutions 
 Whether or not one can say for certain that inequality was embed-
ded in our major social institutions prior to the end of the Civil War, 
one can certainly argue that such was the case after the Civil War and 
the end of Reconstruction. Examining closely the time following the 
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end of Reconstruction up until the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
one can see how the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson 209 and the cementing 
of de facto and de jure segregation across the United States caused 
inequality to become entrenched in almost all major social, political, 
and governmental institutions in the United States. While a complete 
accounting of how this happened in various parts of society is beyond 
the scope of this article, what follows are a few highlights that demon-
strate the degree to which inequality and subordination became em-
bedded in nearly every aspect of American life. 
a. Politics and Voting 
 As early as 1790, through the Naturalization Act, the founding fa-
thers limited eligibility for naturalized citizenship to free white people, 
who more often than not were men.210 Thus, nonwhite immigrants, 
slaves, and Native Americans were excluded from the beginning.211 Yet 
during the time of Reconstruction, there was a rise in black enfran-
chisement, voting, and political participation, though these trends did 
not last long.212 The rise of the Ku Klux Klan and other similar groups 
that used violence to intimidate blacks and sympathetic whites helped 
keep their victims from the polls and out of political activity.213 Fur-
thermore, several states used a variety of legal means to limit black’s 
participation in the political process; poll taxes, white primaries, and 
other mechanisms such as literacy tests and grandfather clauses re-
sulted in the widespread disenfranchisement of blacks.214 While many 
of these provisions and tactics were not race specific, their purpose was 
clear and they resulted in a system rife with intentionally built-in ineq-
uity meant to subordinate whole groups of people.215 While the civil 
rights movement, the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act216 and 1965 
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Voting Rights Act217 helped alleviate many of these past problems, the 
widespread disenfranchisement, lack of political participation, and po-
litical inequity affecting blacks are still persistent problems today.218 
b. Employment, Housing, Education, Healthcare, and the Criminal  
Justice System 
 Inequity in employment has long and deep roots in the United 
States.219 Beginning with the system of slavery, inequity in employment 
has been a continuous problem.220 Traditionally, the best jobs were re-
served for white males while lower-paying, unskilled positions were left 
for women and people of color.221 This was accomplished through sev-
eral measures including blatant refusals to hire;222 the barring of 
women and people of color from certain types of jobs within the work-
force;223 refusals to train so that minorities could not acquire the skills 
necessary for the job; and by prohibiting the joining of a union, mem-
bership of which was sometimes required to enter a particular profes-
sion or trade.224 As a result of these measures, the means by which one 
might earn a living and accumulate wealth were largely foreclosed ei-
ther explicitly by law or implicitly by custom.225 
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 Housing was no different. Redlining, discriminatory lending poli-
cies,226 restrictive covenants,227 and even realtors’ refusal to show cer-
tain people houses or rent-available units in a given location228 meant 
that even those who had the economic means to live anywhere still 
were often not able to do so. Such inequality and subordination were 
also embedded in the education system. As Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,229 its predecessor cases,230 and its progeny231 made clear, unequal 
education was the purposeful norm in the United States. While per-
haps improving in recent years, segregated and unequal schools con-
tinue to be the norm in many parts of the country.232 
 This widespread inequality and embedded subordination contin-
ues to permeate other major social institutions as well. For example, 
until the important decision in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospi-
tal 233 and the passage of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,234 segre-
gated healthcare on all levels was the norm throughout America.235 
While segregated medical facilities are largely a thing of the past, the 
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inability to access quality healthcare on the part of the poor and mi-
norities remains.236 
 Furthermore, the inequality inherent in the criminal justice system 
is legendary, and has been addressed at length in several articles and 
books by a range of scholars.237 The system has been repeatedly used to 
criminalize certain kinds of behavior that differentially impact minori-
ties primarily as a tool to subdue them.238 For example, during the time 
of slavery, criminal statutes barred slaves from the following: 
[L]earning to read, leaving their masters’ property without a 
proper pass, engaging in “unbecoming” conduct in the pres-
ence of a white female, assembling to worship outside the su-
pervisory presence of a white person, neglecting to step out of 
the way when a white person approached on a walkway, smok-
ing in public, walking with a cane, making loud noises, or de-
fending themselves from assaults.239 
These same laws allowed for more severe punishments for crimes 
committed by slaves as opposed to those committed by whites.240 Simi-
larly, after the Civil War, the Black Codes that spread throughout the 
South criminalized several forms of innocent conduct.241 Although pre-
sumably neutral on their face, these Codes were enforced only against 
blacks with the intent that whites would be able to dominate blacks and 
return them to a position reminiscent of slavery.242 Thus, even when 
laws were stated to appear as if they applied equally to everyone, they 
                                                                                                                      
236 Agency for Healthcare Res. & Quality, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Na-
tional Healthcare Disparities Report 5–8 (2003), available at http://www.ahrq. 
gov/qual/nhdr03/nhdr2003.pdf; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Medicare: What the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services Can, and Should, Do, 9 Depaul J. Health Care L. 667, 667–68 (2005); 
Watson, supra note 235, at 205–10. 
237 To understand the voluminous nature of this work one need only run a search on 
an articles database, or in a library catalogue using keywords such as “race,” “crime,” and 
“inequality.” 
238 Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 76 (1997). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 76–77. 
241 Id. at 84–85; Sinclair, supra note 12, at 61–62. 
242 Kennedy, supra note 238, at 86 (“Although this and other vagrancy statutes were si-
lent as to race, their authors intended and assumed that they would be applied principally, 
if not exclusively, against Negroes.”); Sinclair, supra note 12, at 59. Kennedy also notes 
that many such laws were invalidated, repealed, or ignored during Reconstruction. Ken-
nedy, supra note 238, at 86. 
304 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:263 
have been enforced differentially.243 The racially biased criminalization 
of certain behaviors, differential enforcement of crimes, and the failure 
to guarantee fair and unbiased trials are all problems that persist to-
day.244 Accordingly, from housing to education, employment to the 
criminal justice system, and nearly every institution in between, ine-
quality, and subordination have been embedded into the structures 
and systems at nearly every level of American society for hundreds of 
years, and they persist to the present day. 
5. Inequality and White Supremacy Are Entrenched in American 
Culture 
 If one defines culture as consisting of the customary beliefs and 
social forms of a social group,245 then subordination and inequality are 
embedded in American culture, attitudes, and beliefs as well. As previ-
ously discussed, this country was founded on the ideology of white su-
premacy.246 Inherent in the ideology of white supremacy is the con-
comitant ideology of the inferiority of everyone else. The degree to 
which this ideology permeated and continues to permeate the thoughts 
and beliefs of the vast majority of Americans is formidable, but a few 
stark examples are sufficient for the present discussion. Chief Justice 
Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott is once again helpful, since he stated 
clearly: 
 [Negroes] had for more than a century before been re-
garded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to 
associate with the white race, either in social or political rela-
tions; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the 
white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might 
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was 
bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of mer-
chandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. 
This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civi-
lized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in 
morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disput-
ing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every 
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grade and position in society daily and habitually acted upon 
it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public con-
cern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this 
opinion. 
 And in no nation was this opinion more firmly fixed or 
more uniformly acted upon than by the English Government 
and English people.247 
 Lest we believe that such beliefs are only held by hardcore racists, a 
couple of other examples are also informative. For example, President 
Lincoln, often revered and remembered for having freed the slaves,248 
certainly did not imagine that they would become full and equal mem-
bers of society when he stated: 
I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor of 
bringing about in any way the social and political equality of 
the white and black races—that I am not nor ever have been 
in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualify-
ing them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people, 
and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical differ-
ence between the black and white races which I believe will 
for ever forbid the two races living together on terms of social 
and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, 
while they do remain together there must be the position of 
superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in 
favor of having the superior position assigned to the white 
race.249 
 In a similar vein, Justice Harlan in his famous dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, where he forthrightly declared that “[o]ur Constitution is 
color- blind,” took great pains to point out in the next breath that this 
colorblindness did not mean in reality that the races were equal when 
he stated: 
 The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in educa-
tion, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue 
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to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and 
holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.250 
And if one questioned his view that nonwhite races were different and 
likely inferior, Justice Harlan’s comments regarding those of Chinese 
descent are also illustrative: “There is a race so different from our own 
that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the 
United States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, abso-
lutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race.”251 
 While such blatant statements of white supremacist beliefs made in 
mixed company may be largely a thing of the past, it is not clear that 
such sentiments have entirely faded. Recent psychological studies show 
that while the vast majority of white Americans outwardly express atti-
tudes evidencing a belief in equality, when put to the test, those same 
people may not actually embrace those beliefs to the extent they pro-
fess.252 
 A recent study in sociology lends further support to these find-
ings.253 In this study, college students on a predominantly white campus 
in the Mountain West were asked to keep journals as part of a larger 
national study that sought to document the national atmosphere of ra-
cism on college campuses.254 Specifically, these students were asked to 
document racist events in classes, on the university campus, and in the 
communities in which they found themselves.255 The researchers envi-
sioned racism as living along two dimensions: traditional racism, which 
embodies acts of blatant racism, such as burning a cross or killing a 
person because of skin color, that nearly everyone would agree are rac-
ist, and liberal racism, which can be considered discrimination in its 
more subtle and unconscious forms.256 The researchers then classified 
the 951 entries that became part of the study into four categories, two 
falling under the rubric of traditional racism and two falling under the 
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rubric of liberal racism.257 They labeled the first of the traditional ra-
cism categories “no doubt” racism.258 This category consisted of inci-
dents evidencing behavior over which there would be little disagree-
ment on the fact that it was racist.259 They labeled the second 
traditional category “segregationist racism,” and in that category they 
put instances of “marked attempts to distance people of color from 
whites.”260 The other two categories, which they labeled “Revisionist 
Racist Narratives” and “Equal Opportunity Racism” fell under the lib-
eral racism rubric.261 What was most striking about the results of this 
study was the fact that the incidents recorded in the student journals 
evidenced “no doubt” racism three times more often than its liberal 
counterparts, thus directly calling into question the prevailing notion 
that blatant forms of racism are an infrequent thing of the past.262 
Apart from these more formal studies, it is easy to find personal anec-
dotes reflecting these same residual subordinating beliefs.263 
 The categories by which we classify people in this country and 
place them in inferior and subordinated status groups are so en-
trenched and so much a part of the culture that they have become 
more than the norm; rather, the nature of embedded inequality and 
the way we perpetuate it is virtually invisible to most of us.264 Attendant 
to the unconscious and invisible bias in our culture is an unawareness 
towards the privileges experienced by those who sit on the top of the 
American hierarchy, a set of privileges weighed in favor of particular 
groups and established in such a way as to keep the hierarchy in 
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place.265 Thus, inequality and subordination are woven throughout all 
facets of our culture whether we realize and acknowledge them or 
not.266 Equality is not the norm in America; it is the anomaly. 
B. The Perspective Derived from the Truth 
 By acknowledging America’s discriminatory past and recognizing 
that such historical inequality and subordination remains embedded in 
American society, the shift in perspective becomes obvious. If inequality 
permeates all aspects of our lives and we all participate in American 
culture, society, and institutions in ways that help perpetuate that prob-
lem, then to eradicate inequality, the focus should not be finding indi-
vidual bad actors who have deviated from a hopefully clear-cut norm or 
better holding accountable those individuals who discriminate inten-
tionally. Instead, we need to ask ourselves: how do we recognize or 
identify the thought processes and social institutions that create and 
perpetuate inequality and, once identified, how do we change them to 
eradicate the problem. 
 As an example of how this perspective differs, let us look more 
closely at Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.267 The case involved two 
companies that operated salmon canneries in remote areas of Alaska.268 
Jobs at the canneries were of two types, “cannery jobs” and “noncan-
nery jobs.”269 Most noncannery jobs were classified as skilled positions 
and were filled with predominantly white workers hired during the win-
ter months in the cannery offices in Washington and Oregon.270 The 
cannery jobs were largely unskilled and filled predominantly with non-
whites hired locally either in villages near the cannery locations or 
through Local 37 of the International Longshoremen Workers Un-
ion.271 Nearly all of the noncannery jobs paid more than the cannery 
positions and, further, the noncannery and cannery workers were 
housed in separate dormitories and ate in separate mess halls.272 The 
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racial disparity between these two positions was enough to cause the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to rule that the plaintiffs had estab-
lished a prima facie case of disparate impact.273 However, a majority of 
the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In holding that the plaintiffs failed 
to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the Supreme Court 
explained that the Ninth Circuit improperly focused its inquiry.274 
Rather than comparing sectors within a workforce for disparity as did 
the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court majority stated that the proper 
inquiry was between “the racial composition of the [at-issue jobs] and 
the racial composition of the qualified . . . population in the relevant 
labor market.”275 The Court went on to say that “[i]f the absence of 
minorities holding such skilled positions is due to a dearth of qualified 
nonwhite applicants (for reasons that are not petitioners’ fault), peti-
tioners’ selection methods or employment practices cannot be said to 
have had a ‘disparate impact’ on nonwhites.”276 The Court then con-
cluded that if one allowed a within-workforce comparison to form the 
basis for liability, the inevitable result would be the use of racial quotas, 
a result the Court determined was far from the intent of Title VII.277 
The Court stated further that 
[a]s long as there are no barriers or practices deterring quali-
fied nonwhites from applying for noncannery positions, if the 
percentage of selected applicants who are nonwhite is not 
significantly less than the percentage of qualified applicants 
who are nonwhite, the employer’s selection mechanism 
probably does not operate with a disparate impact on minori-
ties.278 
 The majority’s adherence to the traditional perspective is evident 
in this decision, as are the limits of that perspective in identifying and 
rooting out disparity and inequality. As previously identified in this arti-
cle, the traditional perspective has five important components: (1) 
purposeful, intentional, or consciously committed act; (2) motivation 
based on a protected category; (3) the assumption that equality exists if 
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everyone is treated the same; (4) the presumption of inequality as an 
abnormality; and (5) the need for a tangible effect.279 That the plain-
tiffs in Wards Cove fit into the protected category of race was obvious 
and not contested, as was the idea of tangible effect, for if plaintiffs 
were denied certain jobs on the basis of their race the tangible effect of 
the canneries’ actions would also be obvious. The Court’s reliance on 
notions of “same treatment equals equality” is evidenced by the major-
ity’s indication that as long as there were no barriers or practices serv-
ing as a deterrent, there was likely no liability.280 
 While the Court did not focus on intent, since it characterized the 
case from the beginning as a disparate impact case, the ideas of in-
tent—purposeful and conscious action that brings about a result—still 
informed its decision.281 Even though the majority did not look for an 
intentional actor per se, the Court still relied on notions of “intent 
equals culpability” in reaching its decision.282 The above quote illus-
trates this as the Court explicitly states that if there is a dearth of quali-
fied applicants for reasons that are not petitioner’s fault, then there is 
no disparate impact.283 The majority’s reliance on notions of intent is 
also illustrated by the canneries’ use of Local 37, a predominantly non-
white local union, in hiring nonwhite cannery workers. In that section 
of the opinion, the majority explained that the problem was not that 
nonwhites were underrepresented in noncannery positions due to the 
hiring practices of the employers, but rather that nonwhites were over-
represented in the cannery positions because of the use of Local 37 to 
fill those positions.284 Thus, the problem lay not with the employer but 
with the fact that minorities were overrepresented in the union.285 In 
other words, the majority concluded that there was no problem with 
the selection of noncannery workers, despite the fact that very few mi-
norities held those positions; it just might appear so because too many 
cannery workers were minorities as a result of the composition of the 
union, not because of any purposeful or intentional action on the part 
of the employer.286 One can clearly see the majority’s belief that ine-
quality was the abnormality rather than the norm and, unless clearly 
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proven otherwise, the employer benefited from the presumption of 
legitimacy and equality.287 Thus, because of its adherence to the tradi-
tional view and its focus on the basis for comparison, the majority was 
unwilling to sustain a prima facie disparate impact claim for the plain-
tiffs. 
 This case would be addressed much differently under the new per-
spective proposed in this article. Under this new perspective, the fact 
that the canneries in Wards Cove exhibited such disparities would be 
enough to justify an inquiry into the situation. The aim would be to try 
to identify what mechanisms or structures were causing the discrimina-
tory effect. In this case, it would appear, as the plaintiffs alleged, that it 
was possibly a combination of practices such as “nepotism, a rehire 
preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, 
[and] a practice of not promoting from within” the canneries that 
caused the discrepancy.288 Under this new perspective, the task would 
then be to examine each of those practices to see if they contributed to 
a stratified workforce. Put another way, one might inquire as to whether 
less disparity could be achieved if some or all of the mechanisms and 
structures used in hiring were changed. Once the nature of the prob-
lem is identified in that way, the next step is to discern how it can be 
addressed in a cost effective manner. Perhaps the canneries could sim-
ply seek applicants for all positions both locally and out of state to 
eliminate the separate hiring channels, enact a policy outlawing nepo-
tism, or seek to employ objective hiring criteria when selecting appli-
cants for a position.289 
 This example illustrates the advantages of approaching discrimina-
tion problems from this new perspective. First, it allows us to address 
unconscious or structural bias without the difficulty of having to spe-
cifically prove it under the existing Title VII rubrics. Second, and more 
importantly, it allows us not only to address that one instance of dis-
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crimination, but it allows us to change beneficially the underlying struc-
ture even absent the need for a difficult finding of fault. 
C. How This New Perspective Would Change Our Approach to 
Antidiscrimination Law 
 Approaching inequality, subordination, and discrimination from 
the perspective proposed here would hopefully allow us to address cer-
tain aspects of these problems in ways never before attempted. The fol-
lowing subsections illustrate what those different approaches could be. 
1. The Ability to Theorize Around Whole Structures 
 Because our current system only examines specific actors in spe-
cific instances of time and assigns liability based on poor motives, the 
only aspect of the large inequality problem it can address is what hap-
pens in that one point in time.290 For example, in the recent affirmative 
action cases of Gratz v. Bollinger 291 and Grutter v. Bollinger,292 the Su-
preme Court reviewed the affirmative action admissions policies of the 
University of Michigan’s undergraduate and law school programs. In 
both cases there was really no question that both the undergraduate 
and law school programs resorted to various affirmative action meas-
ures as a way to address underrepresentation of minorities in their 
schools.293 In evaluating the constitutionality of both programs, the Su-
preme Court applied strict scrutiny, stating, “We have held that all ra-
cial classifications imposed by government ‘must be analyzed by a re-
viewing court under strict scrutiny.’”294 In Gratz, the Supreme Court 
struck down the undergraduate admissions program based on the fact 
that it did not find the admissions programs to be narrowly tailored to 
the school’s interest in creating a diverse student body;295 it did not 
reach the question of whether diversity is a compelling state interest. 
However, the Court in Grutter did reach that question by determining 
first that diversity is a compelling state interest,296 and then finding the 
                                                                                                                      
290 See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
291 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
292 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
293 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 253–54; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315–16. 
294 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 
227 (1995)); see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. 
295 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270–76. 
296 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–33. 
2007] A New Perspective on Discrimination, Inequality, and Subordination 313 
Michigan Law School admissions program sufficiently narrowly tailored 
to that interest.297 
 What is important for purposes of the present discussion is the fact 
that, in both instances, the Court focused solely on the actions of the 
University of Michigan and the question of whether the school had 
impermissibly considered race in conducting the admissions pro-
grams.298 At no point did the Court address the underlying structural 
reasons why minorities might be underrepresented, staying true to the 
current system of examining individual discriminatory offenses. How-
ever, even if the Supreme Court allows affirmative action programs as it 
did in the case of Michigan’s law school, the continuation of such pro-
grams does not necessarily address the underlying disparities causing 
the problem in the first place. 
 In contrast, an approach that starts from the perspective advocated 
in this article would allow us to do more than look narrowly at the spe-
cific actions of the University of Michigan. Starting from the premise 
that the underrepresentation of minorities in admission to higher edu-
cation is likely due to the vestiges of our historical perpetuation of em-
bedded discrimination and subordination instead of asking the ques-
tion of whether race was impermissibly used as a criteria for admission, 
the new perspective would approach the problem by asking whether 
there is a better way to select and prepare students for higher educa-
tion that would lessen such disparities. While this approach might find 
that affirmative action measures are helpful, it might also be able to 
address other problems in our education system that are affecting mi-
nority admission rates. This is an issue that, as the Michigan cases dem-
onstrate, is not addressable under the current system. 
2. Provides a Justification that Allows Us to Remedy Long-Standing 
Harms 
 Apart from potentially allowing us to theorize and address whole 
structures, the new perspective may also provide another and perhaps 
better justification for taking steps to remedy persistent discrimination. 
If inequality has always been embedded in our systems and structures, 
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then changing them or taking measures to address the problems they 
create makes good sense and is easily justifiable. The selection of grand 
jurors for service in Los Angeles County, which Ian F. Haney López de-
scribes in his article Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New The-
ory of Racial Discrimination, provides a good example of the potential 
beneficial effects of this new perspective and approach.299 
 In that article, Haney López describes how people of color, in par-
ticular Mexican-Americans, were almost never selected to serve on 
grand juries despite the fact that they made up a significant portion of 
the Los Angeles County population.300 This fact was challenged in the 
cases of East LA 13 and Biltmore 6.301 In both instances, the plaintiffs 
were left without redress because they were unable to prove purposeful, 
deliberate, or conscious discrimination, and the court refused to rec-
ognize as discriminatory a selection system that consistently resulted in 
the exclusion of Mexican-Americans.302 Yet it was precisely the system of 
selection in which the judges participated that resulted in persistent 
discrimination without purposeful intent. 
 Haney López explains how the informal, ad hoc process used by 
the judges in selecting grand jurors likely led to this lack of representa-
tion. Specifically, the standard practice for selecting jurors was for the 
judges to select nominees from among social acquaintances.303 In fact, 
as many as 83% of the nominations (211 out of 255) for the relevant 
time period (1959–1968) were social acquaintances of the judges, most 
often friends; neighbors; spouses of acquaintances; or comembers of a 
church, civic organization or club.304 Of the remaining 17% (or 44 ju-
rors), at least 17 were recommended by a “friend, family relation, fellow 
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club member, or another judge.”305 The fact that all of the judges 
picked nearly exclusively from their social acquaintances was not sur-
prising because all of the judges selected jurors in the same way, namely 
by selecting “persons casually from among their personal acquaintan-
ces.”306 While at first glance this selection process would not appear to 
be discriminatory, a problem arises because the people with whom the 
judges were acquainted were a very limited group. The judges knew 
few, if any, Mexican-Americans, and most of the ones they knew were 
gardeners or servants, not the people they would consider for jury se-
lection.307 Moreover, Mexican-Americans were not the only ones ex-
cluded from their social circles.308 Accordingly, although the judges 
may not have purposely intended to discriminate in the selection of 
jurors, the process they used still resulted in discrimination as “the 
judges’ selection practices favored a narrow group of people, and ex-
cluded many, many more. Though the favored group supposedly rep-
resented the population as a whole, it instead reflected one version of 
the elite, a group of people on the higher rungs of a host of social hier-
archies.”309 
 Even though the discriminatory effect was clear and the reasons 
for that effect were readily identifiable, the defendants in these cases 
were still unable to sustain an equal protection claim because they 
could not prove motive.310 Given that the current system defines dis-
crimination as something done by bad actors at specific points under 
the current system, if there is no identifiable act of discrimination or if 
one cannot prove bad motive, there is no discrimination under the law 
even if in reality that discrimination is as clear as it was in East LA 13 
and Biltmore 6.311 
 However, if the new perspective is utilized such that the presump-
tion is that discrimination is the embedded norm, then the potential 
exists for addressing the discrimination in cases such as East LA 13 and 
Biltmore 6. Essentially, the question is no longer whether one can show 
proof of bad actions on the part of the judges; instead, the question is 
whether we can identify what is producing the discriminatory result 
and if so, what can we change to rectify it. As Haney López astutely 
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noted, the problem in the Los Angeles County grand juror selection 
cases was that judges selected jurors by looking almost exclusively to-
wards social acquaintances, which produced discriminatory results be-
cause the social circles from which the judges drew were narrow and 
exclusionary. Once this problem is identified, the solution (or the ap-
proach to the solution) becomes fairly straightforward: the networks by 
which grand jurors are identified, or the pool from which they are 
drawn, could simply be changed. The judges could be prohibited from 
selecting grand jurors from their narrow pool of acquaintances, or a 
different process designed to attract a broader range of participants 
could be implemented. The purpose here is not to determine the best 
specific solution for that problem, but to simply demonstrate that there 
might be a fairly simple solution, one readily identifiable under the 
proposed perspective but currently foreclosed under the present sys-
tem. 
 Additionally, this new approach has the added benefit of getting us 
beyond the issue of blame and the questions of fairness that blame 
raises. When looked at from the perspective of blameworthy bad actors, 
it is hard to hold the judges blameworthy for simply acting within a sys-
tem he or she did not create, had not consciously evaluated, or within 
which he or she was trying to be fair and nondiscriminatory.312 In con-
trast, when looked at from the point of view of a presumption of dis-
crimination, the blameworthiness of the defendant is not an issue be-
cause the focus is on recognizing and addressing structures, processes, 
and similar societal and cultural mechanisms that result in inequality 
and discrimination. Accordingly, we can address an obvious problem or 
instance of discrimination regardless of how “innocent” the defendant 
might actually be. 
3. Moves Beyond the Restriction of Categories 
 As discussed earlier in this article, a person typically must fit his or 
her discrimination claim into a particular category in order for that 
claim to be actionable under the current system.313 However, there are 
many instances of discrimination or unequal treatment where the vic-
tim does not fit neatly into a protected category or suspect class.314 
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Scholars have shown that breaking people into groups as the current 
system requires actually helps create situations of inequality because of 
in-group and out-group favoritism.315 Furthermore, scientists have 
shown that some of the categories, such as race, with which we invest so 
much meaning are social constructs deriving their salience through 
repeated use and context.316 
 If our goal is in fact to achieve true equality, then we should be 
looking to root out subordination and discrimination whenever we 
know it to exist, not just for the people for whom we happen to be a bit 
more sympathetic or for those who we feel are worthy of equality. Being 
a human being should be enough. A perspective that starts from the 
presumption of inequality may allow us to get beyond the restrictions of 
categories and hopefully allow us to do a better job of remedying ine-
quality. With its focus on identifying unequal situations rather than in-
dividual bad actors that are targeting specific individuals, the proposed 
perspective may help us eradicate at least some forms of discrimination 
and inequality that have largely been untouchable under the current 
system. 
 To illustrate this point, let us return to Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 
Inc.317 under this new perspective. In that case, Rene worked as a butler 
on the twenty-ninth floor of the MGM Grand,318 a position which was 
entirely staffed by males.319 During the course of time he worked in 
that position, his coworkers began subjecting him to horrific treatment 
including “whistling and blowing kisses at [him], calling him ‘sweet-
heart’ and ‘muñeca’ . . . telling crude jokes and giving sexually oriented 
‘joke’ gifts, and forcing Rene to look at pictures of naked men having 
sex.320 The coworkers also resorted to physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture on numerous occasions, touching him like they would a woman, 
grabbing his crotch and poking their fingers into his anus through his 
clothing.321 There was little question that Rene was subjected to differ-
ential treatment and that the coworkers’ actions were discriminatory 
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and intentional.322 Despite this reality, the question in Rene’s case was 
whether he was treated that way because of his sex or his sexual orienta-
tion,323 for if treatment were due to his sexual orientation, Rene would 
have no claim under Title VII regardless of how horrific the conduct 
because sexual orientation is not a protected category.324 
 Despite the fact that Rene specifically stated in his deposition that, 
based on the names his coworkers called him, he thought he received 
such treatment because of his sexual orientation, a plurality of the 
Ninth Circuit still determined the harassment was because of sex, not 
sexual orientation.325 However, as pointed out in Judge Hug’s dissent, 
reaching this conclusion took some doing.326 Seizing on the fact that, 
in harassing Rene, his coworkers touched his sexual organs, the plural-
ity determined that because of the places his coworkers chose to touch 
him, the harassment that Rene endured was because of sex.327 Thus the 
Ninth Circuit set an odd precedent whereby, as long as the conduct in-
volves touching of a sexual nature as it did in Rene and arguably Oncale, 
the conduct is actionable even if the harasser makes it clear that he or 
she is motivated by the victim’s sexual orientation. Yet if the harasser 
engages in similar conduct but happens to touch the victim in a non-
sexual way (such as beating the victim severely), then presumably the 
conduct would not be actionable because without the touching in a 
sexual nature, it would not be considered “because of sex.” Therefore, 
one can be subjected to almost identical discriminatory conduct, yet a 
slight difference in the way the perpetrator chooses to carry out that 
conduct will be the difference between redress for the victim or not. 
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 Rene becomes an easier case when reviewed under the new per-
spective. The first step under this analysis is to identify whether there 
are indications that an unequal or subordinating situation is present, 
with the presumption once again being that there likely is.328 Because 
of the manner in which Rene was treated and the facts demonstrating 
that the jobsite was policed by heterosexual, male-dominated norms,329 
it can be easily argued that subordination was present. As a result, the 
question again becomes: what can be done to remedy the situation? In 
other words, is there a way to restructure the selection process to pre-
vent this position from being all male? Are there changes that can be 
made to the management of butlers or the work environment on the 
MGM Grand twenty-ninth floor that may prevent this kind of treat-
ment, regardless of the motivation behind it? Once again, specific solu-
tions are beyond the scope of this article, but the new perspective 
opens up a range of possibilities that the current practice and its focus 
on providing relief for only one ill-treated victim (who may or may not 
fit into the appropriate rubric for legal remedy) cannot contemplate. 
 When approached from the new perspective, our need for catego-
ries becomes less important because the focus is not on addressing in-
dividual instances of inequality, discrimination, and subordination. 
Rather, the goal is to eliminate those instances in whatever form they 
might take. Thus, situations like Rene’s can be addressed not because 
we are willing to address specific instances of intentional discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, but because we are willing to address any 
situation in which discrimination and inequality has an impact. Not 
only would this serve to allow redress of a broader range of claims, but 
there are added benefits that would not be present under the current 
system. First, apart from allowing redress where a person does not 
neatly fit into arbitrary categories but has a viable claim, taking the fo-
cus away from the categories helps make them less salient, which in 
turn helps lessen the law’s role in fostering inequality based on catego-
rization and the notion of in-group and out-group favoritism.330 
 Second, allowing Rene to recover under the current system by 
squeezing him into a category does not truly address the underlying 
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workplace problems that led to his harassment. If Rene recovered and 
MGM paid him money damages, while the victim may have gotten re-
dress, nothing much within MGM’s structure has changed. The work-
place remains all male and the policing of heterosexual, male-
dominated norms likely continues.331 However, MGM would probably 
be careful now to make sure that when those norms are policed, it is 
done in a way that makes it less likely that MGM will be sued or lose if 
sued.332 Thus, the underlying unequal and subordinating structure re-
mains intact. 
 In contrast, a view that focuses on changing the workplace rather 
than just addressing the discriminatory harm to an individual would 
allow us to address the underlying workplace problem by focusing on 
how to change the structure to make it less unequal and discriminatory. 
This more expansive approach not only allows us to scrutinize the dis-
crimination experienced by Rene, it also requires us to look at institu-
tionalized discrimination existing at the workplace: the apparent inabil-
ity for women to obtain butler positions at the MGM Grand. Although 
mentioned briefly in Judge Pregerson’s concurring opinion primarily 
as a way to explain why the policing of male norms may have been so 
strong in that context,333 the major issue of why there are no women 
holding butler positions goes essentially ignored under the current sys-
tem due to the focus on individuals. An approach from the new per-
spective, however, would conceivably allow us to address all aspects of 
the discrimination problems at MGM, including those not raised by the 
victim. 
4. Provides a Better Set of Tools to Combat Subordination and 
Inequality in Ways They Are Currently Manifested 
 One of the reasons for a need to change our antidiscrimination 
laws is the fact that they do a poor job of addressing discrimination in 
its current forms.334 The change in perspective advocated for in this 
article could help to address this problem in several ways. First, part of 
why people act in unconsciously biased ways is that these are cognitive 
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2007] A New Perspective on Discrimination, Inequality, and Subordination 321 
tools that helps us think more efficiently.335 Be that as it may, the con-
tent of our categories and the nature of our biases are largely culturally 
and socially determined.336 At the same time, the norms embodied in 
the law help provide and make salient the nature of our social world.337 
Accordingly, changing the perspective and attendant norms within the 
law should help address and change the norms in society generally. 
 Second, an approach from this new perspective should better help 
address persistent discrimination to the extent that it is largely mani-
fested in the form of unconscious bias.338 Not only does this approach 
point to mechanisms by which we might accomplish this, but it also 
provides justification for doing so.339 At the same time, to the extent 
unconscious bias operates largely in part because of the discriminatory 
structures that are in place, this approach allows us the means to more 
effectively address those structures.340 Lastly, this approach should also 
allow us to address unconscious bias to the extent that it exists and per-
sists because of cultural norms embedded in the society.341 
 There is one other aspect of redressing unconscious bias that this 
approach should allow us to address: the problem of being proactive. 
While it can be helpful to redress wrongs when they occur, it is better to 
prevent those wrongs in the first place. A focus on recognizing unequal 
or subordinating situations and then trying to address them should al-
low us the ability to be more proactive in our approach to this problem. 
For example, studies have shown that bias can effect hiring.342 One 
study conducted by Carl O. Word and his colleagues found that inter-
viewers interacted differently with candidates depending on the candi-
date’s race.343 Specifically, interviewers placed themselves farther away 
from nonwhite candidates, interviewed them for shorter time periods, 
and made more speech errors in their presence.344 In a subsequent ex-
periment, they found that interviewees treated in this fashion exhibited 
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less positive behaviors and were judged more harshly than other appli-
cants, thus causing them to be evaluated less favorably in interview 
situations.345 
 In a similar real world situation, an investment company found 
that it had a problem hiring women.346 In a move to address the prob-
lem, the profiled company reviewed its thirty-minute interviewing 
process and changed its approach to interviewing by lengthening the 
time of interview so as to lessen the reliance on first impressions often 
forced by a shorter interview.347 It also revised its interviewing protocol 
so as to not ask questions that tended to favor men.348 These seemingly 
minor changes significantly changed the tone and substance of the in-
terviews the firm conducted and, as a result, allowed the interviewers to 
interact better and gain more insightful information from nontradi-
tional candidates, both men and women.349 Though a system that 
merely addresses individual harms based on discriminatory intent and 
victim categorization does not provide it, a more progressive approach 
that seeks to identify entrenched inequality and change structures to 
address disparate treatment would give employers the incentive to en-
gage in this same kind of proactive reform. 
Conclusion 
 Sometimes the solution to a seemingly difficulty problem is easier 
to see when the problem is viewed from a different perspective, one 
that at first glance may not be obvious. Consequently, I believe that the 
current approach to eradicating discrimination and subordination in 
American society can be enhanced by viewing those persistent prob-
lems from a new perspective. This new perspective accepts the reality 
that bias, discrimination, and subordination are embedded in and 
permeate all aspects of American society. Until we are willing to address 
and change the many structures, habits, beliefs, and other aspects of 
American culture in which discrimination and subordination reside, 
the seemingly intractable problem of discrimination and subordination 
will remain. 
 My goal with this article is simply to begin the conversation sur-
rounding the possibility of viewing this problem from a different point 
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of view. In so doing, I am not advocating that we throw out our current 
system, for I feel it serves a legitimate, proven, and important function 
that in many cases has rendered positive results. Instead, I am simply 
advocating that we be willing to go beyond that approach and seek so-
lutions that the current system does not provide. At the same time, I do 
not seek to diminish, discount, or criticize the work of those I cite in 
this article and others like them. Rather, I am hoping to simply build 
on the work they have already done. 
 The problem of discrimination and subordination in America is an 
extremely difficult and complex one, so much so that perhaps it is a 
problem that cannot be solved. Yet I do not believe that we should 
cease seeking solutions to this problem or pretend it is solved when it is 
not simply because a remedy appears unattainable. While our current 
system may not have solved the problem in its entirety, we have made 
significant progress under that system nonetheless. Though we still 
have a ways to go, the progress we have made thus far gives me hope for 
the future. 
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